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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to present the Bosque Redondo Reservation experience of 
the Navajo Indians (1864-68) as a failure of the United States Indian Reservation 
Policy. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter gives background 
information about the Navajo Indians from 1680 to 1846. It concentrates on their 
changes in their culture and economy that resulted from contact with the Pueblo Indians 
and the Spaniards. Chapter Two covers the United States- Navajo political relationship 
prior to the Bosque Redondo period (1846-64). It focuses on the reasons behind the 
Navajo removal to Bosque Redondo. The third chapter of the thesis discusses the years 
that the Navajos lived at the Bosque Redondo and it explains why this reservation did 
not become a permanent settlement for the Navajo Indians.
The U.S. Government designed reservations to keep the wandering Native 
American tribes on restricted lands with well-defined borders in order to protect the 
white settlers from Indian attacks and to assimilate the Native Americans into American 
society. The Bosque Redondo Reservation was established for thèse purposes. 
However, economic difficulties, Navajo rejection of assimilation, a political dispute 
between the military officials and the officials of the Bureau of Indian Affairs thwarted 
the reservation policy at Bosque Redondo, and showed the limitations on this 
government strategy for dealing with indigenous peoples.
This thesis uses primary and secondary sources to document the history of the 
Navajo. Government records from the National Archives, firsthand testimony by white 
travellers and the Navajo themselvèS Comprise the bulk of primary sources.
ÖZET
Bu tezin amacı. Navajo yerlilerinin Bosque Redondo Rezarvasyonu'nda 
1864-1868 yıllan arasında yaşadıkları deneyimi Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin yerli 
halklar için öngördüğü rezarvasyon politikasının bir başarısızlığı olarak sunmaktır. 
Tez üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, Navajo yerlilerinin geçmişleriyle 
birlikte Pueblo yerlileri ve İspanyollarla kurdukları ilişkiler sonucunda Navajo 
ekonomisinin ve kültürünün uğradığı değişimden söz etmektedir.İkinci bölüm ise. 
Navajo- Birleşik Devletler arasındaki Bosque Redondo öncesi politik ilişkileri ve 
Navajo yerlilerinin rezarvasyona yerleştirilmesinin sebeplerini anlatmaktadır. Üçün­
cü bölüm ise Navajolar'ın Bosque Redondo Rezarvasyonu'nda geçirdikleri yılları 
incelemekte ve bu rezervasyonun neden Navajolar için uygun yerleşim yeri olma­
dığını açıklamaktadır.
Birleşik Devletler Hükümeti rezarvasyonları, serbest olarak dolaşan yerli 
kabilelerini sınırları çizilmiş belli bir toprak parçasına sokarak beyaz yerleşimcileri 
yerli saldırılarından korumayı ve aynı zamanda yerli halkların Amerikan toplumuna 
asimilasyonunu sağlamak amacıyla düzenlemiştir. Bosque Redondo Rezarvasyonu da 
bu amaçlar doğrultusunda Navajolar için oluşturulmuştur. Fakat, ekonomik güçlükler, 
Navajoların Amerikan asimilasyonuna karşı direnmeleri ve ordu görevlileri ile yerli 
halklarla ilişkileri düzenlemekten sorumlu devlet görevlileri arasındaki çekişme 
Birleşik Devletlerin rezarvasyon politikasını Bosque Redondo'da geçersiz kılmıştır. 
Bu deneyim, federal hükümete yerli halklarla ilgili politikasındaki bu stratejisinin 
sınırlarını göstermiştir.
Navajoların tarihi ile ilgili olarak bu tezde ana ve ikinci derecede kaynaklar 
kullanılmıştır. Birleşik Devletler Ulusal Arşivlerindeki beyazların ve Navajoların 
kendileri ile ilgili olan ifadeleri ana kaynakların çoğunluğunu oluşturmaktadır.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the failure of the assiinilationist reservation policy 
that the United States tried to impose on the Navajo Indians at the Bosque 
Redondo Reservation where the Navajo were held as prisoners of war between 
1864 and 1868.
From beginning of Spanish colonization in New Mexico, to the arrival of 
U.S. settlers in the Southwest, the Navajo Indians remained free from outside 
military and political authority. In 1864, the campaign of U.S. General Kit 
Carson resulted in the surrender of 8,000 Navajos who were then exiled to the 
Bosque Redondo Reservation in southeastern New Mexico. At the Bosque, the 
Navajos became subject to the assimilation program of New Mexico Military 
Commander, General James H. Carlton.
The U.S. government wanted to confine the Navajo at a reservation in 
order to stop Navajo raids on Mexican-American and Pueblo Indian settlements, 
to provide security for miners and to open a path for future railroads and Anglo- 
American settlement. In addition to these military goals, Carlton wanted to test a 
new Indian policy that went beyond the old strategy of making treaties and 
leaving native peoples to handle their internal affairs. The United States pursued 
the policy of treaty making and segregation of Native American tribes from its 
foundation to 1871. The United States signed treaties either to purchase land or 
settle the conflict between Indians and Anglo-Americans. By making treaties, 
the United States recognized the tribal authority of Native Americans and gave 
“reserve land” to them where they would be free from taxation and any other
lând claims, ίπ addition, thc United States agreed to pay for the lands that native 
peoples relinquished. The late-nineteenth eentury expansion of the United States 
to the Vvest threatened lands reserved for Native Americans in earlier treaties. 
Now, instead of making treaties and creating Indian islands on the reserve land, 
the Federal Government considered as new type of reservation where Native 
Americans would be assimilated into mainstream culture and thereby no longer 
think and act like members of independent states. Farming was the most 
important part of this assimilation program. Through farming. Native Americans 
would give up the habit of wandering and hunting and lead a settled life that 
would stop their harassment of white settlers. In addition, making Indians self- 
sufficient farmers would save public money, which was spent for Indian rations 
and annuities.
Carlton had this purpose in his mind when he removed the Navajos to the 
Bosque Redondo. Fie wanted to make the Bosque a big Indian plantation where 
Indians would be farmers and their children would be educated according to 
American manners and taught Christianity. When the transformation was 
complete, the Navajos would melt into the American mainstream.
However, Carlton’s ambitious plan never came true. The Bosque became 
a disaster four years after its establishment. The reservation laeked water and 
fuel. Alkali water caused death among the Navajos. They had to walk ten miles 
to find wood. The soil never produced sufficient crops to feed them. Moreover, 
insect parasites and natural disasters destroyed the fledgling farms and reduced 
the Navajos to starvation. Because of a feud between Carlton and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), federal money was not forthcoming to the fund the project.
The suffering of the Navajos ended when they signed a treaty on June 1, 1868. 
That agreement gave the BIA authority over the Navajo and allowed them to 
return to more productive land in their ancestral homes. Although Carlton’s 
extreme plan for Navajo assimilation failed, the BIA maintained some of his 
ideas, such as educating Navajo children in government run schools and 
promoting vocational training in industrial arts.
The Bosque Redondo brought calamity to the Navajo, but it did not 
destroy them as a people. Before their exile to the Bosque, the Navajo lived as 
small bands scattered throughout territory bounded by what they called the “Four 
Sacred Mountains,” an area of approximately 12 million square kilometers. 
Although, they shared the same culture, the Navajo never united as a whole 
nation. At the Bosque 8,000 Navajos came together and were treated as one 
nation by the United States. They experienced the same difficulties and they 
rallied around their cultural traditions to build a united front of resistance against 
Carlton’s program. Carlton subdued the Navajos militarily, but he could not 
break the their attachment to their culture.
In order to understand why the Navajo were exiled to the Bosque 
Redondo, it is important to know about Navajo contact with the Pueblos, 
Spaniards, Mexicans and Americans. The first chapter deals with Navajo-Pueblo 
contact and Spanish penetration into the present-day state of New Mexico. This 
chapter analyzes the economic and cultural evolution of the Navajo. The second 
chapter is about Navajo-United States relations before the Bosque Redondo 
period. It covers the years 1846 to 1864. The American period before the 
Bosque was characterized by a series of military campaigns and treaties, sparked
by the intaision of U.S. settlers and soldiers into the Navajo’s eastern grazing 
land. Chapter Three examines the Navajo exile at the Bosque and their 
experience with starvation, illness and the assimilation policy of General Carlton.
Il.Cultural and Economic Evolution of the Navajo Indians, 1680-1846.
1. Navajo- Pueblo and Navajo- Spanish Acculturation:
When Spain entered the present-day state of New Mexico they changed 
the lives of Native Americans by introducing new aspects of material and 
symbolic culture. The Navajo were affected by cultural innovations like any 
other tribe in the Southwest. Unlike some other tribes, the Navajo were free 
from Spanish military authority, and this enabled them to accept only those 
aspects of Spanish culture that directly benefited their own goals of preserving 
their independence and enhancing their own political and economic power. 
Indigenous peoples subjugated by Spain, such as the Pueblo, were forced to 
adopt Christianity and the Spanish language, wliile the Navajo could adapt 
herding but escape these impositions of faith and language by virtue of their 
military autonomy. The Pueblo played an important role in Navajo history by 
acting as conduits Spanish culture and by introducing aspects of Pueblo culture 
that the Navajo later adopted. The process of Navajo cultural change involved 
not only their interaction with Europeans, but also other native peoples.
According to archaeological surveys, the Navajo, or the Dine (The 
People) as they call themselves, are part of the Apache and belong to Athapaskan 
speaking group. Lake Athapaska in Canada. It is estimated that between one 
thousand and thirteen hundred years ago, Athapaskan speaking groups began to 
separate. A number of the peoples split off from the Northern and Coastal 
regions and moved into the Southwest, present Arizona, New Mexico and part of 
Texas and northern Mexico where they developed, a number of separated, but
related culture, languages.'The Navajo settled down in Rio Grande Valley after 
the migration. The Navajo had knowledge of farming before reaching the 
Southwest. They learned it probably from the Plain Indians on their journey to 
the south. When the Navajo came to the Southwest, the Pueblo Indians had 
already populated the region. By the time of the Navajo migration, the Pueblo 
Indians were good farmers who planted large farms of corn, beans and squash.^ 
The Navajo came to contact with the Pueblo Indians through raids and 
trade. The Navajo took Pueblo prisoners, mostly women and children who 
became the wives of her master or helper in the house. Through these prisoners, 
they learned dry farming and how to plant and harvest crops in the new 
environment. Farming provided permanent settlement for the Navajo. Production 
of surplus food made the Navajo affluent and increased their population. But, 
prosperity of them stepped up Ute raids from the North that compelled the 
Navajo to change their residence. In order to find better lands for farming and 
protection from the Ute raids, the Navajo migrated westward into Arizona, while 
others moved to the South to mount Taylor in New Mexico and Northward into 
Colorado and Utah.  ^ Those who remained in the East maintained their 
relationship with the Pueblos. The Navajo contact with the Pueblo Indians helped 
the Navajo to survive and adopt themselves into a different environment that 
brought stability and permanent settlement in the Southwest. When the Spaniards
' James F. Downs, The Na\>ajo, Prospect Heights,IL: Waveland Press, 1972. pp.6-11
■ Raymond Friday Locke, The Book ofNa\>ajo, 5* ed., Los Angeles; Mindkind Publisliing 
Company, 1992. p. 67
' Lawrence Sandberg, Early History o f the Navajos, SantaFe, NM: Sunslone Press, 1994.
p.l6
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penetrated into New Mexico in 1540, the Navajo were in transformation of being 
hunters and gathers to agriculturists.
The main objective of the Spanish interest in New Mexico was economic. 
The tale of extremely rich "Seven Cities of Cibola" attracted the Spaniards to 
explore the region. But, the Spanish Crown did not only conquer Native 
American lands, but also compelled the Natives to religious conversion, and 
integration of the Native Americans into the Spanish Empire. The Crown 
adopted Hispanization of Indians as a state policy. This policy aimed to unify 
Native Americans under the Spanish Nationality which had three basic patterns; 
unified governmental and judiciary system; unified language, Spanish; and 
unified religion, Catholicism.·* The Crown authorized the missions and the state 
administrators to America to assimilate the Native Americans to the Spanish 
Empire. The Church and the state set their own programs for the assimilation that 
they thought best for the interest of the Spanish Empire.
The civil authorities cooperated the Indians through political organization 
of the NativeAmerican villages, the production of tribute, distribution of tribal 
land to the Natives and using American labor in Spanish controlled enterprises, 
either on encomiendas^ or mines. ^
’ Arthur, L. Campa, Hispanic Culture in the Southwest, Noniian: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1979. p. 26.
' The encomienda was a granted land wliich was given to a soldier \\ ho fought in frontier 
war with conquistadors as a reward. Tlie encomendos, holders of the granted lands were obliged to 
provide military seivice for the Crown and to assume responsibility for the Natives who were 
residents of the granted landH is responsibility included protection of the Natives against aiemy' 
attacks, gained them working habits and collecting tribute for the Crown. In New Mexico, 
enconiendos hold "repartimiento" or tlie riglit to employ the Native Americans on encoimendas. In 
order to prevent exploitation of Nati\'e labour and hostility towards the Spaniards, the Spanish 
Crown declared "The Orders for New Disco\’eries" in 1573. According to tírese orders, tire Crown 
arranged working hours, wages and Wpe o f the work that the Natives could be compelled to do in 
repartimiento. In practice, the autliorities ignored arrangement of tlie Crown. However, 
encomendos relied upon the Native labour to get profit from granted lands. Tlius. they ignored the
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The missionary program attempted to create a mission community around 
the Church building with cooperating Native Americans. The first aim of priests 
was the conversion of Natives either by persuading or enforcing. But, they 
believed that the Natives could become true Christians when they gave up living 
in savagery and adopted Spanish cultural manners such as speaking Spanish, 
dressing like the Spaniards, having reading and writing skills. Thus, the Churches 
became center of Spanish acculturation as well as center of spiritual manners. In 
addition, the missions were economic units as well. The priests produced 
surpluses that they marketed to raise money to supplement the subventions they 
received from the crown.’ In order to produce more surpluses, priests taught 
neophytes to cultivate European corps such as wheat and watermelon, to raise 
European fruit trees like plums and peaches and to use such iron tools as wheels, 
saws, chisels, planes, mails and spike. Introduction of new corps enriched the 
diet of the natives in the Southwest.*  Another contribution of the Spanish priests 
was the introduction of animal husbandry of domestic European animals such as 
sheep, goats, pigs, horses. Neophytes were responsible to take care of these 
animals for the missions, but they were not allowed to own them.**
Crown's arrangements and Lontinued to exploit the Native American labour. Intense demand of 
Native labor was one of the reasons of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Encomienda sj'stcm in was 
abolished after the revolt. For more infonnation, look Weber's book, Spanish Frontier in Northern 
America (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1992), Cliapter 4.
 ^Howard R. Lamar and Sam Truett, "Tlie Greater Soutliwest and California from 
Beggimiig of European Settlement to the 1880" The Cambridge History o f the Native People o f  
the Americas Vol 1: North America, Part 2, eds. Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
 ^ David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in Northern America.Hew Heaven: Yale 
University Press, 1992. p. 19-20.
* David J. Weber, "Tlie Spanish-Mexican Rim" The Oxford History o f the American
West, ed Clyde A Milner II el all.. New York: O.\ford University Press, 1994. p. 131.
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The Spaniards applied civil and missionary program to those tribes which the 
Spaniards subdued like the Pueblo. Fransciso Vasquez de Coronado established 
military control over the Pueblo during his expedition into New Mexico in 
1540.Hispanization of the Pueblo became intense after the Spaniards founded the 
first colony in New Mexico in 1598. They were forced to adopt Christianity, and 
brutally punished by priests when they practiced their own beliefs. Land holders 
wanted the Pueblo to work for their enterprises and the state officials collected 
tribute money more than the Crown demanded. The Pueblo revolted against the 
Spanish oppression in 1680. The revolt of 1680 was one of the most successful 
revolts against the Spaniards in the New World. It drove the Spanish colonists 
out of New Mexico over a decade. The Spaniards restabilised their authority in 
New Mexico in 1696 after repressed the last Pueblo revolt against the Spanish 
authority. The Revolt of 1680 coaxed the Spanish authorities to rearrange 
Spanish-lndian policy. Encomienda system’*^ was not established in New Mexico 
again. Priests stop persecuting the Native Americans to practice their religious 
ceremonies.The Revolt of 1680 was a reaction against the religious persecution 
and labour demand. After the revolt, they continued to raise Spanish livestock, 
plant European crops and agricultural implements.
Unlike the Pueblos, the Spaniards did not integrate the Navajo into the 
Spanish Empire. The Navajo country was far from the political, military and 
religious control of the Spaniards. Canyons and high mesas of the Navajo 
country provided them protection from the Spanish threat. While the Navajos 
were keeping their isolation, they proceeded encounter with the Spaniards
' Frank McNitt, The Non’ajo Wars, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972.
p. 11.
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through Pueblo refugees, raids and trade. Freedom from the Spanish control, 
made the Navajos able to choose which Spanish traits to accept or reject. ** The 
Navajos accepted Spanish cultural traits that could easily integrated into their 
culture. For instance, the Navajos rejected Christianity and the Spanish political 
system, but they easily accepted the horse, sheep herding, weaving and using 
metal tools such as knives and axes that made their daily life more comfortable. 
Among those traits, adaptation of sheep herding was the most important 
acquisition from the Spaniards that reshaped the Navajo economy and social 
structure.
The Navajo and the Spanish contact was rare until Pueblo Revolt of 1680. 
The First contact between the Spaniards and the Navajo was during expedition of 
Espajo in 1581. In his reports Espajo mentioned mountain Indians who were not 
only peaceful, but brought goods to trade with foreigners at the site of Laguna 
Pueblo, near Mount Taylor .The Spaniards named to all non-Pueblos of New 
Mexico as “mountain Indians” or “apaches”. The Spaniards recognized the 
Navajos as a different tribe in 1626. The missionaries among the Tewa Pueblos 
heard of “Navaju” of Apaches. In 1630, father Alonso de Benevides described 
three different Apache groups; the Xila Apachers who were hunters, the 
Vacquera Apaches who herded buffalo and the Navajo Apaches who were 
farmers. ‘Navajo’ was an Indian term, probably used by Tewa Indians, meant, 
“cultivated fields" Father Benevides established a mission at Santa Clara, the 
Tewa village on the westside of the Rio Grande to convert "Navaju Apaches".
’ Look footnote 5.
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But, Benevides did not convert any Navajos and soon the mission was 
abandoned. The first Franciscan attempt to convert the Navajos at Tewa in 1630 
failed and no new missionary program was applied to the Navajos tliroughout
1600s. 12
The Revolt of 1680 and 1698 provided intense Navajo acquiring for 
Spanish traits. The Pueblo who fled from Spanish oppression and took refuge 
among the Navajos had an important role to introduce both the Spanish and 
Pueblo traits. The Pueblo began to live among the Navajo soon after colonization 
of New Mexico in 1598. After the revolts of 1680 and 1696, large number of 
Pueblos joined the Navajos, lived together and married with the Navajo Indians. 
The Pueblos conveyed what they learned from Spaniards to the Navajos. They 
brought agricultural implements, metal tools such as knives, axes, needles, corps 
and taught art of pottery and weaving.
But none of these traits had as great impact on the Navajo Indians as 
obtaining livestock and horses .The Pueblos were taught to herd and raise 
livestock for the missionaries and encomendos, but they were not allowed to 
obtain neither livestock nor horses. When the Pueblos fled from the Spaniards, 
they acquired some the Spanish sheep. It can be guessed that, the Navajos 
obtained their first livestock from these Pueblos and learned to raise thenx Sheep 
presented alternative food source. The Navajo were not depending on agriculture, 
hunting or gathering to feed themselves. Introduction of sheep changed the 
Navajo way of life totally. They provided cloth, food and wool to weave rugs and
” James Hester, "Navajo Cultural Change: 1550 to 1960 and Beyond", Apeachean 
Cultural History and Ethnology: Antropológica! Papers, The Universtiy o f Arizona, No: 21, 
Tueson: Tlie University o f Arizona, p. 53.
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blankets. From the Pueblo Indians, the Navajo women learned to shear the sheep 
for wool and to spin the wool yarn and dye the yarn by using different plants. 
Thus, sheep became property of women. They built looms to weave the coloured 
yarn into clothing as the Pueblo did The Navajo women reached eminence 
weaving blankets and wool clothes.'^ Sheep also served for a social purpose apart 
from providing cloth and food. According to Navajo tradition, it was a great deal 
to fed visiting clan members to prove generosity of the host. Having enough
extra meat to serve guests was an evidence of hospitality and also his or her 
ability how to livestock.'"'
Horse was the another important domestic animal that was introduced 
by the Spaniards. The Navajo understood the value of horses. Horse became 
property of men. Horses enormously increased the mobility of the Navajo for 
tribal expansion in warfare and in trade. Also, the horse made it possible to visit 
other clan members and gather to the ceremonial meetings.’  ^ The Spaniards did 
not allow the Native Americans to gain horses in order to prevent any action 
against the Spaniards, but they could not stop the Navajo to attain horses when 
they raided on Spanish settlements. Soon the Navajo became excellent riders and 
raiders that threatened the Spanish settlements along the Rio Grande.
Livestock and horses altered the Navajo social structure as well. Being 
owner of livestock and horses became measure of wealth among the Navajo. 
Those who obtained more livestock and horses were called ricos or richmen. In
''Ibid.
13 Sandberg, Early History o f the Nm>ajo, p.31
Peter Iverson, The Na\’ajos, ed. Frank Porter III, New York: Chealsea House 
Publishers, 1990.p. 35.
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each Navajo bands, ricos were respected and influence over other Navajos. 
Poorer ones or owner of less number of livestock were called landores. To obtain 
more livestock and to be ricos, raiding became Navajo way of life. Navajos 
realized that acquiring livestock from the Pueblos and Spanish settlements were 
easier than raising them. During the raids, the Navajos did not kill Mexicans or 
Pueblos except for taking revenge. The Navajos considered Mexicans and 
Pueblos as herders who raised livestock for them.
Raiding gave rise to "headchiefs". Their ability in war, and possession of 
wealth made them leaders of their bands. The Navajo tribe composed of small 
bands scattered al over Navajoland with headchiefs. But, headchiefs had no 
authority in peace time to stop raidings of young warriors who were seeking 
quick fame and improve their strength by stealing livestock.’*^ Thus, although the 
Navajos shared same cultural aspects, they did not have a political unity under 
the leadership of a headchief In the nineteenth century, the United States during 
treaty negotiations did not understand political disunity of the Navajos. After a 
treaty was signed, a Navajo chief was appointed as a headman and the United 
States was supposed him to prevent depredations of landores. However, since 
appointed headchief had no authority to control all Navajo bands, the treaty 
remained on the paper soon.
Apart from sheep and horses, the Spaniards brought slave trade to New 
Mexico. Although, the Crown outlawed enslavement of indigenous people, the 
Spanish state officials ignored the Crown's law in order to supply demand of the
1.·;Ibid.
Marx L, Junior Heyman, "On The Navajo Trail: Tlie Campaign of 1860-61" New 
M evco Historical Review. Vol.XXVI. No.l(n.d): pp.61.
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Native labour to the Spanish enterprises. The Spaniards got slaves either through 
rescate system or slave raids on Native American tribes. According to rescate 
system, the Spaniards paid ransom in order to free Indians that one tribe or band 
had captured from one and another,Taking women and children as captives 
was a long time-practised tradition among some of the Apache, Navajo, Ute, 
Commanche. For instance, the Navajo kept women slaves as servants if they 
could afford to feed them. Often a slave became an extra wife to her master. 
Their children added to another strain to the mixed blood of the Navajo tribe. A 
captive child was treated as a member of family. Some of the captive boys 
achieved to be the richest and the powerful men among the Navajo.'* The 
Spanish law and Christian charity required rescuing these captives by paying 
ransom. After being baptized, they were given to the Mexican families among 
whom slaves were Hispanized. They were taught manners of Spanish culture and 
Christianity. These slaves became servants for the household. They could be set 
free after a period of time and their condition of servitude could not pass on their 
children.'/' Rescate system was considered as assimilation of the Native 
Americans like missionaries attempted to do. Thus, rescate system was 
acceptable for both church and civil authorities. Another way to supply Native 
American labour was enslavement of the Indians during Spanish campaigns 
against a Native American tribe. In New Mexico, captured Ute, Navajo and 
Apache Indians were sold to mining companies in New Spain. In the seventeenth
Weber. Spanish Frontier, p. 127
Ruth Underliill, r/ie A'iai'ayos,2vJorman; University o f Oklalionia Press, 1956. p.8Q
19Weber, Spanish Frontier, pp.127-129.
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century, New Mexico was the biggest Native American slave exporter to New
20Spain.
The slavery had double effect on the Navajo. On the one hand, the 
Navajo exchanged women and children captives with Spanish livestock. On the 
other hand, the Navajos suffered the Spanish slave trade as well. When they were 
raided by Utes, or other Indian tribes or the Spaniards, the Navajo women and 
children were taken as captives and sold to the Spaniards. These slaves carried
the Spanish culture to their tribe if they were able to return either through treaty
21terms or running away and contributed Navajo-Spanish acculturation.
The Navajos emerged as a new people after their acculturation with the 
Pueblo and the Spaniards in the middle of the eighteenth century. Their 
population increased and they scattered through out borders of Four Sacred 
Mountains.The Navajos lived as small communities, from ten to forty families. 
Each community had a defined area of agricultural and grazing land. The
Lamar and Tructt. "The Greater SoiUhtwest and CaliforniaL p.70.
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The Navajo's Four Sacred Mountains are San Francisco Peak, Blanka Peak, Mount 
Taylor and La Plata Mountain According to tlie Na\’ajo Creation m>1h, the Dine (Tlie 
People) reach tlie fourth world after tlieir journey tlirougli the first, tlie second and the 
third w orlds. In the fourlli w orld, the people are prospered and live in liarniony w ith 
animals. But one-day Coyote kidnaps tlie small dau^Uer of Tieholtsodi (Gatlierer of 
Waters) and for tlie revenge, Tieholtsodi brings a great flood to the fourtli w'orld But 
tln-ough a large reed tliat springs up miraculously, Tlie people are able to escape the rising 
w aters and emerge into tliis present w orld. Witli sacred eartli brings up from the 
Underworld, Tlie Holy People create four sacred Mountains; to tlie east tliey prepare a 
mountain of White Shell (Sierra Blanca Peak), to tlie soutli a mountain of Turquise 
(Mount Taylor), to the w^ est a mountain of Abolone (San Francisco Peaks) and to the 
north is placed a momitain Dibentsaa (La Plato Mountain). All tlie lands contain tliere in 
given to Earth people, the offspring of First Man and Woman. Tlie Navajo believe tliat 
Four Sacred Mountains mark the traditional homeland of the Navajo country or Dinetah. 
Througliout their history, tlie Na\*ajo fouglit to keep this traditional homeland out of 
foreign invasion. After returning home from the Bosque Redondo Reservation in 1868, 
the Navajo w'ere given one third of their countiy. But, the Navajos succeeded to enlarge
Navajos became herders and farmers. They raised livestock as well as obtained 
them from raids. Livestock provided them food and clothing. The Navajo women 
became excellent weavers and traded their blankets to the Spaniards and the 
Pueblo Indians in the peacetime. They sow corn and other vegetables and 
cultivated large peach orchards in the Canon de Chelly area. The Spanish and 
the Pueblo acculturation firmly established the Navajos into the Southwest and 
contributed their economic prosperity .
2. Navajo- Spanish and Navajo Mexican Political Relations
In the seventeenth century, the Navajo and the Spanish relationship based 
on Navajo acculturation of the Spanish traits that contributed the evolution of the 
Navajo culture. In the eighteenth century, military campaigns against the Navajos 
and treaties determined the Navajo- Spanish relationship as a result of intense 
Navajo livestock raids on the Spanish and Pueblo settlers.
The Spaniards did not paid too much attention to the growing Navajo until 
the Navajo harassment to the Spanish settlers beginning of 1700s.Like Spanish 
settlers, the Pueblos became targets of the Navajo attacks and they accepted Spanish 
protection. In reprise to the Navajo raids, the Spaniards organized military campaigns 
and captured Navajos in order to sell them as slaves. First large-scale campaigns 
against the Navajos were in August 1705 after the Navajo raided San Juan, and San 
Ildefonso pueblos. The Spanish army under the command of Roque de Madrid forced 
the Navajos to request peace. The Navajos agreed to return the livestock they had run
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off and the Spanish captives. They wished the Spaniards to turn over the captured 
Navajos.^'' It is not clear how many Navajos were taken as captives and whether they 
returned to their people. Because, first recorded baptism of Navajo captives was after 
Madrid's expedition.^^ The peace agreement lasted until 1709 when the Spaniards 
organized a new military expedition.
After the campaign of 1709, the Navajos avoided to be in war with the 
Spaniards. Increasing Ute raids from the north and the Commanche attacks from the 
south led the Navajos to seek alliance with the Spaniards, rather than warfare. 
Occasional Navajo raids on the Pueblos resulted in punitive expeditions by the 
Spaniards but the Navajos were in favour of peace. Peace between the Navajos and 
the Spaniards lasted more than fifty years. “
Peaceful relations between the Navajos and the Spaniards began to decline 
because of the controversy over Cebolleta region, which had good grazing lands for 
Navajo livestock. Moreover, Caboletta had religious importance for the Navajos. It 
was on the base of Mount Taylor, one of the four sacred mountains in the Navajo 
country.^’ From 1772 to 1805, the Navajos fought to keep the Spaniards out of 
Cebolleta.
The Navajo settlement at Cebolleta started with Franciscan missionary 
program of 1746.The first missionary work to convert the Navajo was in 1630 when 
a mission was built at Tewa. However, the mission was abandoned because the 
Navajo were not interested in Christianity. Second missionary attempt began at
Mcnitt, The Ncn’ajo Wars, pp. 19-22. 
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Cebolleta near Mount Taylor, in 1745. The Navajos came to the mission and listened 
to the priests unless the priests provided food to the Navajos. When the supplies run 
off, the Navajos ceased to come. The mission was deserted in 1750. But, the Navajos 
continued to live in Cebolleta area and claimed the region as a part of the Navajo 
country. But the Spanish ranchers and settlers challenged Navajo claim of Cebolleta 
when their number started to increase in the region. The Navajos formed an alliance 
with Gila Apaches in 1772 to withdraw the Spaniards out of Cebolleta. Navajo- 
-Apache alliance continued over a decade that started the Navajo depredations on the 
Spanish frontier. The Navajo attacks decrease after they drove the Spaniards out of 
Cebolleta, but the Apaches carried on scourging the Spanish frontier. Together with 
the Apaches, Commanche raids became unstoppable by the Spanish officials,^*
Weakness of the Spaniards to prevent raids of Comanches, Apaches, Utes 
and Navajos compelled the Crown to rearrange its Native American policy. Ai'chitect 
of the new policy was Viceroy of New Spain, Bernardo de Galvez. In 1786, he urged 
the crown to apply negotiating treaties and distribution of presents and goods to 
secure friendship during peace negotiations which would cost the Crown less than a 
military campaign. In addition, he offered development of the trade relations with the 
Natives and to make the Natives depend on Spanish goods against growing French 
influence on the Gulf of Mexico and the upper reaches of Mississippi valley. The 
French traders broke the Spanish monopoly in these regions by offering an 
alternative source of European goods. In addition, the French did not demand Indians 
to change their culture or religion,^^
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Spanish officials on the northern provinces sought alliances with raider 
tribes after the instruction of the new policy. The Spaniards dissolved Navajo- 
Apache alliance by pursuing peace policy and giving bribes to influential headchiefs. 
In June 1786, a Navajo war party joined an expedition against the Apaches in June.^° 
The Navajo remained at peace with the Spaniards until 1800.
When Governor Chacon opened Cebolleta grazing lands to the Spanish 
ranchers, the Navajos requested the Governor to return Cebolleta to the Navajos. 
However, their request was rejected. In response, the Navajo escalated their 
depredations against the Spaniards. They organized heaviest attack on the settlers in 
August 1804 and forced the settlers to abandon the region. The Spaniards organized 
a military campaign in January 1805. The Navajos asked peace after ninety warriors 
and twenty-one women and children were massacred in a cave at the Canyon del 
Muerto.^' The Navajos signed the Treaty of 1805, but they went on their harassment 
on Spanish settlers to keep them away around the Mount Taylor. The Spaniards were 
too weak to stop Navajo raids because of Mexican War of Independence.
Mexico gained its independence in 1821 that ended Spanish rule in New 
Mexico. The Spanish- Indian contact that lasted over two centuries altered the 
lives of Native American tribes in New Mexico. When Mexicans took over the 
government from the Spaniards, the Mexicans abandoned Spanish-Indian policy.
The Mexican government did not negotiate peace with the Indian tribes. All 
Native Americans would be treated precisely as any other citizens of the republic 
Indians would not have different status and the government avoid the use term
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'Indian'. Moreover, Mexican government granted equal participation in political 
life. In addition, the government turned over mission lands to the Indians after
32secularization of the missions.
However, the Mexican government was too weak to execute new Indian 
policy because of politic turmoil in the country after its independence. In New 
Mexico lack of military control strengthened Apache, Commanche and Navajo raids 
and Mexican reprisals. Mexican settlers organized volunteer groups and raided into 
Indian lands for taking slaves. Although the Mexican government outlawed slavery 
like the Spaniards did, the practice of slavery continued. The United States realized 
twenty years after taking over New Mexico that slave raids were main reason of the 
Indian aggression. In his proclamation. President Andrew Johnson abolished any 
kind of slave trade either by Indian tribes or New Mexicans on June 9, 1866.
During the Mexican period from 1821 to 1846, the Navajo raids 
carried on a large scale. The Navajos raided livestock and in reprise, the 
Mexicans enslaved Navajo women and children. On the eve of American 
invasion of New Mexico, the Navajo population was estimated seven or eight 
thousands. They were owner of 500.000 sheep and thousands of horses. They 
were farmers as well as good herders. Because of their prosperity and raids, the 
Mexicans called the Navajos 'Lords of the Earth'
Mexican rule of New Mexico ended after the War of 1846 and the 
United States took control of the region. After singing the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, Mexico ceded Utah, California and New Mexico to 
the United States. The treaty enlarged the boundaries of the United States half a
Ibid.
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million acres. Thus, the United States extended its jurisdiction over the Mexican 
settlers and the Native Americans.
Cultural adoption reshaped Navajo society. In economics, herding 
transformed Navajo and enriched them. The simplest means of enlarging a herd 
was raiding. Raids had a negative consequence in that they formed the basis of 
larger disputes between the Navajo and their European and Pueblo neighbours. 
Much of the military history of the Navajo in the Southwest can be understood as 
a long-running war to control livestock and avenge raids on individual herds and 
families. The 1864 campaign that confined the Navajo to the Bosque Redondo 
had its origins in a familiar dispute over raids and reprisals between the Navajo 
and nearby settlers. The pattern of Navajo-European relations established during 
the Spanish colonial period carried on into the nineteenth century. As the United 
States would later attempt, Spain tried to assimilate subjugated native peoples to 
European culture in the hope that changing their language, religion, and customs 
would eliminate Native American demands for political independence and control 
of land. The success of assimilation under the Spaniards was uneven. Native 
Americans outwardly appeared to adopt European habits at those times when they 
were completely subjugated by the force of Spanish arms. Yet even the Pueblo, 
who were under the direct military control of Spain, rose up in rebellion in the late 
1600s and demonstrated that they had not internalized the norms of Spanish 
culture nor had they given up their aspiration for independence. The Navajo 
watched and learned from these experiences. In the late 1860s they found 
themselves at the mercy of the United States army and were forced to go through 
a process of assimilation similar to the experience of the Pueblos over a century
32 Edward H. Spicer, Cylcs of Conquest, Tucson; Uni\’ersil of Arizona Press, 1962. P.334.
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before. Like their predecessors, the Navajo refused to abandon their own 
traditions and ultimately they thwarted the plans of their conquerors to erase their 
culture. »
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II. The United States in New Mexico, 1846-1861:
Early in their 1846-48 war with the United States, Mexico lost political 
control of the Southwest. The change brought the Navajo into contact with the 
United States. As in their earlier experiences with Spain and Mexico, 
misunderstanding and conflict characterized Navajo relations with the U.S. Between 
1846 and 1861, Navajos and Americans fought a series of wars that ended in treaties 
which both sides, but especially the U.S., failed to honor. Neither the Navajo nor the 
United States was able to clearly understand the motives and goals of their opponent. 
The Navajo believed that the Americans could be handled like the Spaniards and the 
Mexicans. That is, they realized that the U.S. had designs on the Dinetah, but they 
believed that they had the military power to prevent a full-blown occupation of their 
homeland. Working under this assumption, various headchiefs continued to raid 
non-Navajo settlements and engage in futile wars against the stronger U.S. army. 
For their part, the Americans shared the misperception of the governments of Spain 
and Mexico that the Navajo and other Native Americans lived in a state of barbarism 
and could only be dealt with by total conquest and a transformation of their culture to 
that of the victors. In 1861, General Edward Canby launched a new type of 
campaign against the Navajo. Canby waged war not oonly against Navajo warriors, 
but also against their civilians and their ecnomic resources. His troops burned fields 
and destroyed livestock. As a result of this total war policy, one that Union 
commanders used later in the Civil War against the Confederacy, the Navajo were 
forced to concede more than ever before too a military opponent. The full fruits of 
mutual mistrust and hostility were born in the 1864 campaign led by General Kit
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Carson and the ensuing four-year confinement of the Navajo to the Bosque Redondo 
Reservation. There, neither side got what it wanted and the main players in the 
struggle either lost their power or were disgraced in the eyes of their own people.
1. Navajo Indians and the Treaty of Ojo del Oso ( 1846):
The border dispute between Republic of Mexico and the United States turned 
into war in 1846 when the Mexican army crossed the Rio Grande to patrol the Nuecos 
boundary. President Polk considered the action as invasion of the United States and on 
May 14, 1846 he declared war on Republic of Mexico. The treaty of Guadalup 
Hidalgo, on February 2, 1848, ended the war between the two countries and Mexico 
ceded Utah, California and New Mexico (including Arizona) that enlarged the 
boundaries of the United States half a million acres. Also, The United States took 
charge of the Indians that lived in these ceded areas, including the Navajos.
The United States gained the control of New Mexico when General Kearny 
took Santa Fe, capital city of New Mexico, in August 1846.0n August 18, General 
Kearny declared that New Mexico was under the jurisdiction of the United States and 
the New Mexicans were citizens of the United States. In addition. General Kearny 
promised protection against the depredations of the Navajos and Apaches
By the time Kearny's army invaded New Mexico, the warfare between the 
Navajos and the Mexicans existed. These wars generally caused by raids, carried out 
by both sides. The New Mexicans raided into Navajoland, for slaves who were both 
sold in New Mexico and Mexico. The Navajos in return would raid the Mexican 
settlements and ranchers taking captives and livestock.^^ Before leaving for
California, General Kearny authorized Colonel Doniphan to sign treaties with the 
Indian tribes of New Mexico for this purpose.
Colonel Doniphan sent scouts to inform the Navajos of the peace treaty and 
the Navajos agreed to hold the peace council at Ojo del Oso (Bear Springs). The 
Navajos called the Americans, Bilangaana (New Men) and the meeting at Ojo del 
Oso brought Americans and the Navajos for the first time. Colonel Doniphan 
explained that New Mexico, including Dinetah, was now the territory of the United 
States and the Mexicans who lived in that territory were the citizens of the United 
States . The United States was responsible to protect her citizens against any wrong 
doings of the Navajos. Also, the Navajos who were under the jurisdiction of the 
United States would have the same protection against the New Mexicans if they 
attempt to do the same thing. Colonel Doniphan’s explanation confused the Navajos 
who did not understand why the Mexicans would be protected by the United States 
while they were the enemies of Bilangaana as chief Zarcillos Largos (Long 
Earrings) answered Colonel Doniphan:
Americans! You have strange cause of war against the Navajos. We have waged war 
against the New Mexicans for several years. We have plundered their villages and 
killed many of them and made many prisoners. We just cause for all this. You have 
commenced a war against i!ie same people. You are powerful. You have great guns 
and many brave soldiers. You have therefore conquered them, the very thing we 
have been attempting to do for so many years. You now turn upon us for 
attempting to do what you have done yourselves. We cannot see why you have 
cause quarrel with us for fighting the New Mexicans on the West, while you do the 
same thing on the East. Look how the matter stands. This is our war, we have more 
right to comp’lain of you for interfering in our war than you have to quarrel with us 
continuing a war we had began long before got there. If you will act justly, you will 
allow us settle our own differences.^'’
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Through interpretation Colonel Doniphan explained that, the Mexicans were no 
longer enemies of the United States, the war between the Americans and the 
Mexicans were over and repeated that if New Mexicans or Navajos caused 
depraditions, they would be punish according to laws of the United States. Important 
headchiefs, like Narbona and Zargillos Largos accepted the peace treaty in hope that 
Americans could stop slave trade and bring backen slaved Navajos held by the New 
Mexican.
The treaty was signed on November 22, 1846 and according to treaty of 
Ojo Del Oso “all the property taken by either Navajos or New Mexicans since the 
18th day of August last, shall be restored” also, “there shall be a mutual restoration 
of all prisoners”. The treaty also, allowed free trade in Dinetah and New Mexico, 
between Navajos and New M exicans.The first treaty between the Navajos and the 
United States did not bring any restriction on slave trade of the New Mexicans.
Also, this treaty was the beginning of “misunderstandings” of the Navajos 
by the Americans that continued until 1868. The Navajos had no political unity to 
comply the treaty terms because of the political structure of the Navajo. Each Navajo 
band had a headchief who was only responsible to control his band and had no 
authority over other Navajos. No leader had a power to speak for all Navajos. 
Those chiefs who signed the treaties with the United States bounded only their bands 
to keep treaty terms. On the other hand, the United States treated the Navajos as a 
single political body and considered the headspokesman as the leader of all
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After signing the treaty with the Americans, the Navajos became curious 
about the power of the United States that divided the Dine over the issue. When the 
Americans took New Mexico, Narbona had secretly observed “the New Men” at 
Fort Marcy, north of Santa Fe, and he had been impressed by the weapons and 
soldiers of the United States that urged his friends to sign treaty with the United 
States. Like Narbona, Zarcillo Largos was also influenced by the power of Bilagaana 
who defeated Mexicans, enemy of the Navajos for centuries. Those who were against 
to sign any treaty with the Americans were young warriors like Manuelito, son -in­
law of Narbona. According to Manuelito, the Navajos had signed treaties with 
Spanish and Mexicans that neither brought peace nor returned their captive women 
and children to them and signing a new treaty with the Americans would bring the 
same results. Also, the Americans claimed right over the Navajo country.^^ The 
insurrection at Taos, Northern New Mexico in 1847 changed the Navajos’ opinion 
about the power of the United States which promised protection and punishment for 
the Mexicans.
The insurrection was plotted by dissident New Mexicans who by day were 
innocent citizens, but by night rode as guerilla raiders with the fugitive outlaw 
Manuel Cortes and with his Indian allies. On January 19,1847, dissident New 
Mexicans killed Governor Bent and other five Americans at Taos. Until Colonel 
Price’s Missouri volunteers came and bombed Taos, Northern New Mexico remained 
under the control of the New Mexicans. Some of the instigators were caught and
Spiccr.p. 231. 
’**Locke, p.210.
hanged, however, Manuel Cortes remained on to fight independently as guerillas or 
occasionally to join raids with Indian allies (Cheyenne and Apaches). The Navajos 
did interfere the revolt, in fact they were not interested in who killed whom, but they 
observed enough “weakness” of the United States against the Mexicans/^
Colonel Price's Missouri Volunteers suppressed the insurrection at Taos. 
Some of the instigators of the Taos Revolt were caught and hanged. However, leader 
of the insurrection Manuel Cortes continued to fight against the American Army and 
he joined raids with his Cheyenne and Apache allies. The Navajos did not interfere 
the revolt, but they observed the military weakness of the United States to end the 
revolt. The Navajos considered the Bilaagana- the Americans- not strong enough to 
protect them from the New Mexican slave raids as it was promised in the Treaty of 
Ojo del Oso. Articles of the treaty of Ojo Del Oso remained on the paper soon after 
the Navajos signed it. The treaty ignored the New Mexican slave trade in Dinetah 
and the slave trade remained unchecked. '“ Navajo raids stepped up along the Rio 
Grande throughout 1847. In return, the New Mexicans organized slave raids into the 
Dinetah. Also, they requested military action against the Navajos for ‘protection’ as 
the United States promised.Under the command of Major W.H.T. Walker, the Santa 
Fe battalion started an expedition into the Navajo country in order to punish 
robberies of the Mexicans on September 10. Major Walker’s battalion was made up 
Indian allies and New Mexican volunteers and small artillery and provisions of two 
months. Major Walker penetrated into the Dinetah with help of his Indian scouts and 
marched toward the Canon de Chelly. But, the battalion found the country deserted.
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The Navajos had abandoned their settlements together with their livestock before the 
battalion reached into the Dinetah.'** The Navajos were good raiders but not fighters. 
They did not develop a military culture like their neighbours Utes for whom war was 
the apex of living.''^ ,. During their raids, the Navajos did not destroy the Mexicans 
because the Navajos considered them stock raisers for them to drive off?  ^When they 
faced with military expedition, they retreated themselves into deep canyons and high 
mesas of the Dinetah for protection rather than fighting with the enemy. The Navajos 
used the same tactic when Santa Fe battallion came into the Navajoland.
The first military expedition of the United States against the Navajos was disaster. 
The Santa Fe battalion wandered into Dinetah without chasing Navajos or any 
livestock to supply finishing provisions. Close to starvation the soldiers had to eat 
their pack mules and when the last mule was gone, they subsisted on the meat of dog. 
The battalion returned to Santa Fe on October 14.The New Mexicans disappointed 
the result of the expedition .As the newspaper R e p u b l i c a n  wrote, only lasting peace 
with the Navajos could be achieved when they felt the full force and power of the 
government through a war of destruction,'''’
In May 1848, Colonel Newby who was appointed as new military 
commander of New Mexico, led an second expedition into Dinetah. He called a 
Navajo peace council to discuss a new treaty. Navajo head chiefs, included Narbona,
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Zarcillos Largo, Jose Largo, met Colonel Newby at Monte del Cayanta and on May 
20, the Navajos signed another treaty with the United States. Unlike the Doniphan
Treaty, the Newby Treaty ordered “entire restoration of all prisoners....by either of
the parties, and the people of New Mexico” and the restoration would be “ full and 
complete with the regard to the number prisoners held”. In addition, the Navajos 
would deliver three hundred sheep, one hundred mules and horses. In his report on 
June 17, Colonel Newby wrote that the Navajos had fully complied with their part of 
the agreement and surrendered 12 Mexican captives^  ^ But, unlike the Navajos, the 
New Mexicans did not equally exchange the Navajo prisoners. Colonel Newby tried 
to restore Navajo prisoners as it was promised it the treaty. However, he wasunable 
to bring back the Navajo slaves to their families.'**' In addition, the Congress did not 
ratify the Newby Treaty. Again, the Bilaagala disappointed the Navajo Indians.
2.The Treaty of Washington (1848):
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo concluded the Mexican-American War on 
February 2 1848,and the United States ceded California, New Mexico, Utah that 
enlarged her boundaries half a million acres. The treaty brought changes in the 
military and civilian government within the New Mexican Territory. Colonel J. M. 
Washington replaced Newby and he was appointed civil and military governor of 
New Mexico. In addition, the Indian agency at the Council Bluff was transferred to
'Nbid.,p. 191, 
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Santa Fe and James S. Calhoun became the first Indian agent of the Territory 
.Calhoun was in charge of several tribes, including the Navajo knew little about 
them.When Calhoun came into the region, he already accepted the current view that 
the Navajos had to be chastised and subdued.''^ Washington and Calhoun cooperated 
in order to solve the Navajo problem. However both officials dismissed the Mexican 
slave raids which were main cause of the Navajo aggression on the settlers.
Washington led an expedition on August 16, although there was no 
indication that the Navajos broke the Newby treaty. The Navajo kept the expedition 
observed and saw destruction of cornfields by the soldiers. The Navajo requested to 
hold a peace council with the United States. Navajo chiefs, Narbona, Jose Largo and 
Archuleta met Washington and Calhoun at Canyon de Chelly. At the peace council, 
Calhoun and Washington explained to the Navajos what Doniphan and Newby had 
explained before. The Navajos were under the jurisdiction of the United States.They 
had to respect this jurisdiction and they had to stop their depredations against New 
Mexicans. Otherwise they would be punished according to the law of the United 
States, or if someone did wrong doing against the Navajos they would have the same 
treatment. When it was their turn, Navajo chiefs asked when would the New 
Mexicans will return Navajo captives and they demanded that the Colonel to stop 
destruction of corn fields.
Both parties agreed to sign a new treaty, but an unfortunate incident 
destroyed establishment of peaceful relationship between the Navajos and the United 
States. During the negotiations of treaty terms, a New Mexican volunteer recognized 
his stolen horse. Washington demanded the horse from the Navajos and sent his men
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to seize it. As the soldiers approached them, the Navajos fled into small groups and 
Washington ordered his troops to open fire. When the fight ended, six Navajos were 
killed, included Narbona who was known as man of peace, but described by Colonel 
Washington as “ scourge of the people of New Mexico for past thirty years”.
Death of Narbona angered the Navajos and headchiefs like Zarcillo Largo 
and Manuelito. They rejected to join any meeting with the Americans. On the other 
hand, Colonel Washington continued his expedition in Dinetah .On September 
9,Colonel signed the treaty with three chiefs who had less importance among the 
Navajos.According to the Treaty of Washington, All-American and Mexican 
captives and all stolen property would be restored. Trade in Navajo country would be 
arranged according to intercourse laws of the United States. Those Americans and 
Mexicans, if maltreat the Navajos, they shall be arrested and punished and it would 
be for the Navajos, if they cause depredations. The most important article of the 
treaty was article VII which allowed the United States to establish military post and
48agencies in Dinetah.
Washington disregarded Navajo tradition of headchiefs and by signing a 
treaty with two less influential chiefs and he took all the Navajos responsible with 
the treaty terms. Ironically, the treaty was ratified by the United States Congress on 
September 9, 1850. Instead of bringing lasting peace into New Mexico, Colonel 
Washington’s expedition worsened the Navajo-U.S relations. Although there was no 
indication that the Navajos broke the Newby Treaty, the Navajos witnessed 
destruction of their hogans, crops and live- stocks by the U.S. army. In addition.
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Washington caused death of respected chief Narbona. Colonel Washington’s lack of 
knowledge about the Navajo political organization and values made the treaty of 
Washington worthless from the start. Outraged Navajos carried out their raids before 
the army reached Santa Fe and restored their destroyed livestocks. New Mexicans 
requested establishment of military posts for protection against the incursions and 
robberies of the Navajos. In the fall of 1849, a detachment of troops was stationed at
49San Isydro in the Jemez Valley and a second post was located at Cebollata,
As military measures was being taken to stop Navajo raids, Calhoun tried 
to solve the Navajo problem by disregarding military and applying his civil policy. In 
his reports to Washington, Calhoun advised the commissioner of the Indian affairs 
that only way to prevent raids of Indians in New Mexico was creation of restricted 
areas, away from the white settlers. But his advises ignored by officials in 
Washington/*^ Also, Calhoun realized that the Mexican slave trade was one of the 
reasons of the Navajo raids. He believed that ending the slave trade in Dinetah would 
stop many Navajo raids in New Mexico. For this purpose. Colonel Munroe, who 
replaced Washington, declared a statement that the government in November 1849 
would license all traders to the Navajos. Washington and Calhoun not only hoped to 
stop illegal slave trade, but also ban gun traders who furnished the Indians with the 
ammunition, and liquor dealers from the region. Unfortunately, since slave and gun 
trading were profitable business in the region, licensing of the traders did not change
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anything. Traders became more careful on their operations and the slave trade 
remained unchecked until 1850.^ *
In 1850, Congress ratified the Treaty of Washington and appropriated 
$18,000 to Navajos as it was told in the treaty. At the same time, the office of 
military and civil governor of New Mexico was divided into two different offices. 
The Civil governor's office was transferred to Department of Interior while the 
military office remained in the hands of the War Department. Also, the Congress 
divided New Mexico territory into four Indian agencies in order to assist the 
Superintendent of the Indian Affairs in New Mexico.Calhoun was appointed as the 
first civil governor of the territory. But, for the protection of settlers from Indian 
depredations, both offices had to cooperate with each other. However, this created 
problem of authority over the Indian-U.S. relations. Calhoun felt that as a civil 
governor of New Mexico, he was responsible to arrange relations between the 
Indians and the New Mexicans But, Calhoun needed the help of the army to protect 
settlers from Indian raids. On the other hand, army officials, like Colonel Sumner, 
considered that the army was not only responsible for the protection of white settlers, 
but also protection of the Native Americans from the white aggression.
After being governor of New Mexico, Calhoun thought that to raise a 
volunteer civilian force could stop Navajo raids. For this purpose, on March 18, 
1851,Calhoun declared a proclamation to encourage raising a volunteer army. 
According to Calhoun’s plan, volunteers would make an expedition to subdue the 
Navajos. In short time, the New Mexicans composed ‘Six Companies of Volunteers’
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under the leadership of Mexican Navajo fighter Manuel Chevez. He offered Calhoun 
to pursue the Navajo to their extermination or complete surrender. Calhoun asked 
Munroe to iurnish the volunteers with guns and ammunition for a new expedition 
into the Navajo country.Calhoun wanted Munroe to give arms to the Pueblos who 
suffered under the Navajo depredations for centuries.
At this situation. Colonel E. V. Sumner was appointed as military 
commander of New Mexico on March 29, 1851 . Sumner had special orders from the 
War Department He was instructed to construct several military posts in the 
Navajoland as well as making an expedition to force the Navajos to keep the terms of 
the Washington treaty. There would be no new treaty with the Navajos until they had 
been made to feel the power of arms of the United States. Sumner did not take 
immediate action to subdue the Navajos. Rather, he dealt with rejecting Calhoun’s 
policies and establishing his authority in Navajo relationsf^Sumner considered the 
Navajo problem as a military matter. He dismissed Calhoun’s plan to raise a 
volunteer army. Sumner believed that New Mexicans were also part of the trouble in 
the region. Furnishing the volunteers with arms could increase illegal slave trade and 
thereby could provoke more Navajo raids. Sumner gave only 75 muskets to 
Calhoun’s volunteers when the troops were withdrawn from Fort Marcy to Fort 
Union and Calhoun worried that the New Mexicans would remain defenceless. But, 
Sumner allowed the use of arms with strict conditions. He gave arms only for 
defence. If they were used for the volunteer expedition, the army would punish
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anyone who abuses his orders.*'  ^ Sumner started the Navajo expedition in mid 
August 1851. When he reached Canon Bonito, he ordered Major Bacus to construct a 
small fort there. Sumner hoped to check Navajo raids and New Mexican slave traders 
by establishing a fort in the Navajo country. However, the Navajos thought building 
of the fort as invasion of Navajo land. Although, the Navajos attacked supplying 
wagons carrying implements for the construction of the fort. Major Bacus soon 
succeeded in building it. The fort was called ‘Fort Defiance’ because of its bold 
location in the heart of the Navajoland .
While Sumner was carrying on his expedition, he sought to make peace 
with the Navajo as well. Before he marched into Canyon de Chelly, the Colonel 
sent messengers to Navajo headchiefs for a peace council. On December 25, 
Sumner and governor met about two hundred Navajo at Jemez. During the 
negotiations, disagreement between Sumner and Calhoun appeared once more. 
The Navajos agreed to keep quiet, restore all Mexicans captives and gave three 
hostages to show their good faith. In return, Calhoun delivered $ 3000 worth of 
gifts to the headchiefs.Sumner was disturbed by Calhoun’s action. He believed 
that presents should have been given if the Navajos remained in peace at least for 
six month.^  ^ On January 27, 1852, a delegation of Navajo came to Santa Fe and 
delivered'three captive Mexican boys to prove their willingness for peace with the 
United States. Except for a few incidents, peace between the Navajos and New
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Mexicans lasted until the spring of 1853.^  ^ In March, the Navajos began their 
raids near Pena Blanca and took a small number of livestock. On May 3, a New 
Mexican rancher Ramon Martin and his son were killed near Valletico and two 
boys were captured and his stock was stolen. Also, in the same month, a large 
number of sheep flock, belonged to another New Mexican rancher were taken 
near Ojo de Gallina.^“ Governor William Carr Lane, who replaced Calhoun in 
1852, authorized two agents to investigate the murderer and he suggested that 
Sumner took military action if the Navajo did not surrender the murderers. 
Sumner gave ultimatum to the Navajoto comply the terms of the Treaty of 
Washington. The Navajos were given until July 6 to surrender the murderers, 
deliver the captive boys and restore stolen stock, otherwise their country would be 
invaded by U.S. troops. The captive boys and stolen stocks were returned without 
any difficulty. But, to surrender murderers to the Americans was difficult task for 
the Navajo. A Navajo could take refuge among other bands that had little 
knowledge about treaties or Americans as in the case of Martin and his son. Since 
no headchief had authority over the headchief of another band to surrender 
criminal, murderer could live among his new band.
Instead of surrendering the murderers, the Navajos offered blood money 
that was a Navajo tradition. For the Navajos, a killing could be pardoned by 
paying goods to the family of the dead person.'"' However, both Sumner and Lane 
rejected Navajo proposal, and insisted on surrender of the murderers. For the
40
Locke, p.270.
''“ Reeve, p. 102.
Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico 1858- 1880", New Mexican 
Historical Review, Vol.XII July (1937): p. 224.
American officials, a murder case was the matter of the United States’ authority to 
execute its laws of the United States over the Indians under its jurisdiction. From 
this point of view, criminals had to be judge and punished according to process of 
law.
Although Sumner threatened the Navajo with a new expedition, he 
understood that the Navajos were unable to surrender the murderers. He was 
satisfied with restoration of the stolen stock and came to the opinion that war 
would be costly and unnecessary. Colonel Sumner’s passive attitude to take action 
against the Navajos was criticized by Lane. In fact,Lane who was running 
Congress, made the Martin case an important issue for his political campaign and 
called for a civilian militia to invade Navjoland to chastise the Navajo. Sumner 
warned Lane to use army to prevent any misdoing of New Mexicans against the 
Navajos.Lane lost the election and David Meriwether was appointed as new 
governor of New Mexico. General JohnGarland replaced Colonel Summer. When 
Garland and Governor Meriwether came to New Mexico, Martin’s case faded 
away.
At the same time, Henry L. Dodge was appointed as new agent to the 
Navajos. His friendly attitude to the Navajos and personal efforts kept the Navajos 
out of trouble during his service. Unlike previous agents, rather than writing 
reports to Washington, Dodge visited isolated Navajo settlement in the Navajo 
country. He was interested in improvement of Navajo farming by providing them 
modern agricultural implements subsidized by the government. In 1853, Agent
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Dodge brought the Mexican blacksmith, George Carter in who taught the 
Navajos to work iron and copper
3. Treaty of Laguna Negra (July 18,1855) and the Trouble on Grazing Lands:
The Navajo intended to remain in peace, but the immense grazing area of 
the east of the Navajo country was a natural attraction for sheep growers of the 
Rio Grande Valley. The Navajo resisted the Americans to give up eastern grazing 
lands as they did to the Spaniards. They attacked settlers and killed Mexican 
herders But, the New Mexican ranchers continued to drive their livestock into the 
Navajo country. Moreover, the United States District Court’s decision that 
declared New Mexico an Indian Country, legally opened the Navajo grazing lands 
to the New Mexicans. Meriwether felt powerless to prevent harassment of the 
Navajos by the New Mexican ranchers and Navajo raids. After he took the office 
in 1853 Meriwether sent reports to the Commissioner of the Indian Affairs in 
Washington. In his reports, he recommended to extinguish Indian land titles with 
a treaty and establishment of reservations in order to remove the Native 
Americans in New Mexico from the vices of white settlers^’'* With these reports, 
in July 1854, Congress appropriated $ 30.000 to make treaties with Apache, 
Navajo and Utes. In the spring of 1855, Meriwether was instructed to make 
arrangements to provide a reserved land to the Indians as their future and 
permanent home. The instruction also included introduction of private land 
ownership to the Native Americans. For this purpose, farming land would be
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allotted to each single person over twenty one years age or a head of a family 
from twenty to sixty acres. Private land ownership was foreign not only to the 
Navajos but also other Indian tribes as well. Among the Navajos water, timber salt 
and land were considered as common property. The Navajos moved from one 
place to another to find better grazing and farming land. Also, the geography of 
the Navajo country, which had great deserts, isolated canyons, river bottoms and 
mountain slopes made suggestion of allotting lands from twenty to sixty acres 
Navajo land was suitable for animal husbandry with its broad grazing land rather 
than farming.
The meeting to negotiate new a treaty was held at Laguna Negral4 miles 
to the Fort Defiance on July 16 1855. The Navajos chose Manuelito as their 
spokesman Meriwether read articles of the treaty; as the spokesman, Manuelito 
objected to the fourth and ninth articles. The forth article set the boundaries of 
Navajo reservation. Manuelito told Meriwether that the Navajo country was a 
bigger than it was proposed in the treaty. He pointed out that only one of the four 
sacred mountains was in the limits of the Navajo reservation. He emphasized that 
Chaco Canyon was an ancestral homeland where Navajos lived for centuries, but 
it was excluded from the borders of Dinetah. Furthermore, the Navajos used to 
journey tb the salina near Zuni, a source of salt that was out of the new borders of 
Dinetah as well. Meriwether explained that the Chaco Canyon was arranged as a 
buffer zone between the New Mexicans and the Navajos. Furthermore, the 
government would pay $10,000 annually to the Navajos for this area. For the
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salina. Governor Meriwether added special order to the forth article that permitted 
the Navajos to gather salt from there.
The Second disagreement was on the ninth article. It proposed the 
surrender of all Navajos who caused depredations. He opposed the ninth article. 
Because, no headchief could take responsibility to surrender someone who took 
refuge among his kinsmen. Meriwether rejected Manuelito’s request on the 
grounds that Americans could not distinguish bad Navajos from the good ones. 
Twenty-seven Navajo headchiefs agreed to sign the treaty of Laguna Negra on 
July 18, 1855. For the first time the Navajos ceded their traditional homelands and 
the treaty pushed them onto a reservation. However, the treaty was not ratified by 
the Senate after an unfavourable committee report which considered the eastern 
boundary of the reservation that had best grazing lands, was too favourable for the 
Navajos.*'  ^The treaty meant nothing to the New Mexican ranchers who violated 
the borders of newly established Navajo reservation and carried on grazing their 
herds over best grazing lands. The Navajos had to deal with overgrazing problem 
together with slave raids.
Until the spring of 1856, the Navajos did not commit any depredation 
and respected treaty terms. The harsh winter of 1855-56 forced many Navajos 
families to consume their livestock to survive. Also, they had to endure raids of 
Utes Commanches and Kiowas who suffered as much as the Navajos. Governor 
Meriwether and the army were unable to protect the Navajos from Indian raids 
and government aid was given denied them. Agent Dogde was aware of the
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situation and he predicted that Navajos would raid New Mexicans if no aid were 
given to the Navajos. The treaty was broken in March 1856 when a New Mexican 
rancher named Antonio Jose Otera reported a Navajo raid and the murder of three 
herders .Governor Meriwether ordered Agent Dodge to investigate the raid and 
surrender the murderers. After the investigation. Agent Dodge discovered that the 
leaders of the raiding party were belonged to the respected and rich families; one 
was son of Narbona, two others were sons of Archuelito, leader of San Juan 
Navajos. Agent Dodge brought back stolen sheep, but not the murderers. No 
Navajo could dare to surrender them. If they were surrendered, the Navajos would 
make reprisals against the white settlers. In fact, this raid was warning to the 
Americans who were unable to protect the Navajos from the Indian lands and 
keep the New Mexicans out of Navajo grazing land.*"^
While the tension between the Navajos and the Americans was increasing, 
Manuelito worsened the relations by driving his herds into the grazing lands of the 
Fort Defiance that were taken away with the Treaty of Laguna Negra. Although 
Major Kendrick warned Manuelito to keep his stock out of the Fort’s area and 
respect the treaty terms, Manuelito claimed Navajo heredity right over the grazing 
lands. He also challenged Major Kendrick to organize a war party if he tried to get 
him out of the grazing lands. Dodge advised Kendrick not to take any action unless 
sufficient forces came to Fort Defiance. Arrival of new forces compelled 
Manuelito to retreat his herds from army grazing land for a short time/® As the
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Split between the Navajos and the Americans widened, the man who could work 
out the treaty terms for both sides, agent Dodge was killed by the Apaches while
• 71he was on a hunting trip near Zuni^
"Fearing Time":
The Navajo call the period between the Treaty of Laguna Negra (1856) to 
end of their exile at Bosque Redondo Redondo "Fearing Time". The period 
remarks the Navajo resistance to keep eastern grazing lands into the borders of 
Dinetah and increase of Navajo raids to prevent white settlement in this era.
The grazing land dispute enhanced the power of Manuelito.’  ^ American 
penetration into Navajo land, continuous Mexican slave raids and broken treaties 
with the United States gathered more Navajos around Manuelito. When leader of 
the peace party Zarcillo Largos joined Manuelito's side, the Navajos followed an 
aggressive policy. Manuelito challenged the U.S. authority by organizing two 
bold attacks on Fort Defiance.
However, the Navajo's struggle to defend their land rights caused series of 
military campaigns from 1856 to 1864. Each campaign resulted in destruction of 
Navajo crops and livestock that led the Navajos into poverty. The Navajos 
became more and more dependent on government rations. Moreover, Navajo 
aggression in this period gave General Carlton an excuse to exile them to Bosque 
Redondo in 1864.
The Navajo's resistance for the eastern grazing lands began after signing of 
the Treaty of Laguna Negra. The treaty brought a nominal peace to the Navajos
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and the United States. But, there was always a possibility of war breaking 
because of Manuelito's harrasment of Fort Defiance grazing land.^  ^ Manuelito 
decided to remove his herds out of the army’s grazing lands when Zarcillos 
Largos insisted not to strain the relations between the United States and the 
Navajo, but, Manuelito kept his livestock on Fort Defiance’s grazing lands. As a 
result. Major Brooks, commander of the foil, ordered his soldiers to kill all the 
livestock on or near the army’s grazing land. Angered by the action of the U.S. 
soldiers, Manuelito called for war during a meeting among the Navajo chiefs. 
Zarcillos Largos affected other Navajo chiefs to remain in peace with the 
Americans!'  ^ Although Zarcillos Largos struggled to keep peace, murder of Major 
Brooks' slave on 12 July 1858 by a Navajo dragged the Navajo into the conflict 
with the United States. At the end of the campaign, the Navajos had to sign 
Bonville treaty which forced them to give up more lands on the east.
Outraged by death of his slave. Brooks demanded the surrender of the 
rnurderer according io the Laguna Negra treaty. In response, Zarcillo Largos 
remained Major Brooks that his soldiers destroyed Manuelito’s herds six weeks 
ago and the Americans did not pay the damage or restore his property. Like, 
Brooks, 'Zarcillos Largos emphasized that the Americans had to comply with 
treaty terms before demanding anything from the Navajos. However, Brooks 
considered Zarcillos Largos action as an ‘insult’ to the United States. He gave 
twenty-one day ultimatum to the Navajos to deliver the murderer otherwise the 
Navajos would be chastised for their irresponsible action. Major Brooks wrote to
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Adj. General of New Mexico and he called for additional troops and asked for a 
possible campaign against the Navajos who refused to keep peace treaty/^
On the last day of the ultimatum (July 21), the Navajos delivered the dead 
body of a Mexican slave and tried to pass him off as the murderer of the black 
slave. However, after a medical examination, it was understood that corpse of the 
claimed murderer was a very young man whereas the murderer was described as 
forty years old. In fact, the Navajos tried to solve problem through Navajo 
tradition. The Navajo had paid the property damage of Brooks by killing another 
slave that belonged to a Navajo.But ,  from the American point of view, the 
Navajo action was a trick and violation of laws. A murderer had to be punished 
because of his wrongdoing. Brooks called for a new expedition.
On August 29, Adj. General authorized Colonel D.S. Miles to command 
the new Navajo campaign. Miles entered Canyon de Chelly killed six Navajos 
captured a few women, children, horses and sheep and lost two soldiers and three 
wounded campaigns. Miles was unable to chase the Navajos. He realized that it 
was impossible to fight with the Navajos in a decisive battle on the field since 
they run away and hid in caves and mesas of Canyon de Chelly. Miles also 
believed that each expedition brought temporary peace to both sides. But, soon 
after the Navajos raided New Mexicans to restore their livestock demaged during 
the expedition. Miles did not want to continue his campaign in winter because of 
hard weather conditions in Dinetah. When Miles returned to Fort Defiance, he 
learned that Zarcillos Largos and a delegation of Navajos requested peace and
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Miles signed a thirty days armistice with the delegation on November 20,1858. He 
asked newly appointed Adj. General of New Mexico, Benjamin Bonville whether 
he could start peace negotiations. Bonville and Superintendent John L. Collins 
rejected armistice terms and they prepared a new treaty. The peace council for the 
new treaty was held in Albuquerque.
Treaty terms were similar to the treaty of Laguna Negra. The Navajo 
would restore or pay damage of the New Mexicans property since August 15, the 
whole nation would be responsible for future depredations. But, nothing was 
mentioned about the New Mexican slave raids or any proposal was made to 
prevent New Mexican depredations or protection from Indian enemies of the 
Navajos. All Mexican and Navajo captives were to be surrendered. The most 
important article of the treaty was the first article that drew the borders of Dinetah 
again. The eastern boundary of the Navajo country was moved further inside that. 
This moved away the best grazing and arable lands of the Navajos. In addition, 
three to five thousand Navajos living on the eastern frontier had to move to the 
west. Also, the army would establish military posts, Indian agencies or use newly 
gained lands for farming purposes. The Bonville Treaty took one third of Dineh 
and relinquished any Navajo grazing rights on the eastern boundary that opened a 
way for future New Mexican settlements. The cause of the war, surrender of the 
Navajo murderer was not demanded or even mentioned during the negotiations.
The treaty was signed on December 25 1858 and Huerro was appointed as 
headchief of the Navajos. Zargillos Largos and other chiefs of the peace party
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joined the council. Manuelito and supporters did not come to Albuquerque. It was 
certain that Maunelito rejected the Bonville treaty and new boundary of Dinetah. 
Although Manuelito did not accept the Bonville Treaty, he did not cause any 
trouble throughout 1859. Zarcillo Largos was also successful to keep young 
Navajos out of troubles a good sign for their sincerity to keep peace, Collins 
distributed the annuities to the Navajo. The Navajo were willing to keep peace, 
but Ute raids from the north and weakness of the U.S. army to control outlaws 
caused Navajo reprisals. In February 1859, Collins called Navajo chiefs, Navajo 
agent Yost, Ute chiefs and Ute agent Christopher Carson to join a peace 
conferance in Denver to stop Ute raids and Navajo reprisals. Both tribes agreed to 
sign a peace treaty that would be enforced by the United States. The treaty did not 
end the long feud between them. Utes carried on their attacks together with New 
Mexican volunteers. The continued scouting activities for taking slaves. The 
Navajos responded the same way. In May, the Navajos stole 3,000 sheep and 
killed two herders that provoked the New Mexican scouting activities.’^
Although the Navajos became the victims of Ute and New Mexican raids, 
Collins considered the Navajos as troublemakers. He compelled Bonville to 
organize a new campaign in order to accomplish the peace treaty. Unlike Collins, 
General Bonville was convinced that majority of the Navajos was in favour of 
peace and only a few "landores"' were causing trouble. He remained the 
Superintendent cost of a campaign^®, But, pressure from the Superintendent and
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the citizens of New Mexico coaxed Bonville to authorize Major Simonson to 
command a new Navajo expedition. Major Simonson would remind the Navajos 
articles of agreement that bind all the Navajos to stop depredations of landores. 
Major also demanded restoration of stolen property that was worth $ 14,000 from 
the New Mexicans since August 15, 1858. Major gave thirty days for payment!' 
The Navajos paid 10% of the claims but refused to pay the rest of it. Actually, 
Zarcillos Largos and other Navajo chiefs had had enough to restore the stolen 
property. Although, the Navajos restored New Mexican property and returned 
their captives after each treaty, they had a neither promise of protection against 
the New Mexican and Ute raids, nor restoration of Navajo captives.
A year later, Zargillo Largos joined Manuelito's side. The first result of 
this alliance was an attack on Fort Defiance's grazing camp on January 17, 1860. 
Manuelito and Huerro led a force of about two hundred warriors against the hay 
camp. The Navajos burnt haystacks, but fire of the soldiers repealed the attack**^ . 
The Navajos stepped up their depredations in response to New Mexican and Ute 
attacks.
The Navajo attack outraged the New Mexicans and they called for the army 
to subjugate the Navajo . On the other hand, newly appointed Colonel Thomas T. 
Fauntleroy preferred arrival of additional troops to command to win a full-scale 
war against the Navajo. But the Navajo's second attack on Fort Defiance sped up
83the organization of the Navajo campaign.
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believed that late punishment could encourage Navajos to escalate their 
depredations. Until the military preparation completed. Rancher recommended 
organization of a volunteer army to defend themselves. Fauntleroy allowed an 
expedition of a volunteer force that composed of 300 Utes arid New Mexicans. 
They burnt Navajo hogans and corps, stole their livestock and took captives. 
Volunteers destroyed the Navajo economic resources before the military 
e x ped i t i on .T he  military expedition started on 12th of September and 
Fauntleroy assigned Colonel Edward Canby to command the campaign. Canby 
made an earth-scourge campaign that the Navajos had never witness before. He 
employed Ute and Pueblo Indians as scouts and guides. Canby ordered destruction 
of Navajo livestock, crops, grazing lands and water sources.**^  Canby returned to 
Fort Defiance after staying in the field for a month.
But Canby did not retreat his troops from Navajo land and he considered 
possible winter expedition. Canby understood that the Navajo policy was not to 
fight but to hide. They would not fight unless driven to points from which there 
was no escape or forced to do so in defence of their families and f locks.They 
could be subdued only through continuos and persistent war throughout the year 
and by forcing them to come out of their hiding places.
Canby invaded strategic points of the Navajo country where they could 
come back for food and kept them deserted from water and food supplies. In 
addition, soldiers relentlessly pursued the Navajo. Captured Navajos were
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released to inform their people that operations would continue until the whole 
Navajos asked for peace.*^  ^The Navajo resistance came to an end in January. The 
Navajo signed a new treaty with the United States on February 15, 1861. The 
chiefs surrendered unconditionally, they accepted to prevent depredations of 
landores and assist the United States for their surrender. In return. Colonel Canby 
promised the Navajos protection of the United States against the outlaws.
Although the Canby Treaty promised protection from the army against the 
Mexican and the Ute Slave raids, they took advantage of weakened Navajos and 
intensified their raidings. Especially, the New Mexican carried on their 
depredations and provoked the Navajos to seek revenge. But, Canby was willing 
to keep outlaw Mexicans out of Dinetah. For this purpose, Canby employed more 
than four hundred soldiers along the New Mexican frontier line. He ordered 
soldiers punishment of Mexicans and enemy tribes of the Navajos if they caused 
any depredations or slave raid. But Colonel Canby's desire for peace was 
interrupted by the civil war. Removal of the troops to protect New Mexico from 
Texan invasion left the frontier line unchecked by the army. The army's departure 
renewed the long-standing feud between the New Mexicans and the Navajo.***
During the Civil War, Canby had little intention to protect the Navajos from 
Ute and New Mexican raids and keeps the peace among these groups. But the 
American soldiers broke the peace between the Navajos and the Americans after 
the massacre of the U.S. soldiers at Fort Fauntleroy.
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After the Canby treaty, the Navajos came to Fort Fauntleroy to take 
rations. For the Navajos ration days turned into a festival that lasted over a week. 
Navajos traded blankets jewellery and joined horse races over which Navajos 
wagered with American soldiers.
On September 10, 1861, ration day became more crowded than usual. The 
Navajos were told to make a new treaty to replace the Canby that had been not 
ratified by the Congress. The number of the Navajos at the Fort increased while 
they were joining and betting on horse races. The biggest was on 22 September 
between Manuelito's horse and that of the fort's Assistant Surgeon Finis E. 
Kavanaugh. Manuelito lost the race. However, he discovered that his bridle was 
deliberately cut, and the Navajos demanded to run the race again. Soldiers 
rejected the proposal and returned to the post with their larg e bet. When a 
Navajo tried to enter the Fort after the soldiers he was shot dead and this followed 
fired on other Navajos. Soldiers killed fifteen Navajos most whom were women 
and chi ldren.The massacre at Fort Fountleroy ended the peace with the 
Americans and enhanced the Navajo raids along the New Mexican frontier during 
the Civil War.
The Navajo challenged American authority by stepping up their 
depredations in order to defend eastern grazing lands. But, the United States 
responded to Navajo raids by organizing military campaigns that weakened the 
Navajos economically and psychologically. Canby's campaign of 1861 brought
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about the unconditional surrender of many Navajos, including several important 
chiefs such as Manuelito, Ganado Mucho and Barboncito. When the Navajos 
signed Canby’s treaty in 1861, they were hungry and poor. Canby’s scorched 
earth expedition damaged animal husbandry and agriculture so much that the 
Navajos had to depend on government rations.
Canby’s campaign marked a shift in U.S. policy towards the Navajo. With
greater resources at his command and growing white demand for Navajo land,
Canby fought a war of total conquest that aimed at destroying the material base of
Navajo society in order to bring them under the total control of the U.S.
government. Although Canby’s tactics were new, the causes of conflict were old.
Disputes arising from raids on livestock and individual battles over honor, like the
outcome of the horse race at Fort Fauntelroy, continued to spin out of control into
full-scale wars between the Navajo and their neighbors. The inability of either
side to prevent these conflicts from starting and growing reflected the mutual
suspicion that each had of the other’s motives. In the end. United States officials
believed that Navajo culture itself was the source of the trouble. Stereotyping the
Navajo as belligerent nomadic thieves, white Americans thought that the Navajo
would only stop fighting when they adopted Anglo-American ways. The U.S. not 
only failed to see the richness of a culture that diverged from the stereotype, but
they also ignored the Navajo’s determination to preserve their culture and their
control of the Dinetah, As the Bosque Redondo years would prove, more than
military might was needed to overcome that determination.
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III. The Navajo Indians at the Bosque Redondo ReseiTation, 1864- 68:
From the beginning of Spanish colonization in 1600s to the American 
settlement in the Southwest, the Navajo resisted political and military control of 
Spain, Mexico and the United States until the Campaign of 1864. Carson’s 
expedition did not only break long time Navajo resistance but also the Navajo 
were removed to Bosque Redondo Reservation in the southeast of New Mexico. 
They were held at the Bosque as prisoners of war until they signed Treaty of June 
in 1868 that allowed the Navajo to return their homeland. Bosque Redondo was a 
traumatic experience for the Navajo. American officials attempted to change 
animal husbandry Navajo economy into the agrarian one. However, the crop 
failure for four years because of draught, flood and insects never transformed the 
Navajo agrarians as officials hoped. Instead, the Navajos were reduced to depend 
on army rations that never became efficient to subsidize eight thousand Navajos. 
Diseases malnutrition, economic and political mismanagement of the reservation 
and raids of the Commanche and the Kiowa, sunk the Navajos absolute poverty 
and despair. The Navajo despair at the Bosque provided political unity and 
cultural resistance among the Navajo Indians against the assimilation policy of the 
United States. The Navajo shared common things culturally, but, they were 
decentralized politically. They used to live scattered small bands with a headchief 
At the Bosque, for the first time eight thousand Navajos had gathered and all of
’’ Sherman to Grant, June T* 1868 M666 Letters Received by the Office o f Adjutant 
General, Roll 639 1868,
them shared the same difficulties. The U.S. government dealt with the Navajo as 
one people and equally, the Navajo began to view themselves as politically one 
unit While the Navajo were suffering from hunger, illness and homesickness, 
the Navajo endured discomfort of the Bosque by attaching to their cultural beliefs. 
For instance,during religious ceremonies large number Navajos gathered and 
prayed together to end their calamity at the Bosque that created spiritual unity and 
cooperation.
The Navajos at the Bosque were victims of Carlton's desire to establish 
policy of assimilation of the Native Americans on reservations as an alternative to 
the treaty making policy of the United States. Until end of 1840s, the United 
States pursued policy of 'treaty making and separation'. The Constitution 
authorised Congress to make treaties and to regulate trade with Native American 
tribes. Treaties had two purposes. They were signed either to declare peace or to 
acquire land from the Indian tribe. When land was acquired, the Indian tribe 
relinquished all land rights to the United States except for the areas that were 
reserved to the tribe forever and Indians could keep their tribal authority. In 
return, the Federal Government agreed to pay for the relinquished land.
In 1840s,was the era of expansion of the United States. In this period,the 
United States annexed Texas in 1845, settled Oregon dispute with Britain in 1843 
and gained California, New Mexico, Utah and Nevada from Mexico as result of 
treaty of Guadalup Hidalgo in 1848. The United States expansion policy was 
justified with a national doctrine called "Manifest Destiny." According to this
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doctrine, God destined the United States to expand her boundaries from Atlantic 
to Pacific and carry out the Anglo civilization to all over the continent. Manifest 
Destiny influenced Native American tribes directly. The Native Americans were 
considered as barriers to American progress. Location of the Native Americans on 
reserv-ations by treaty and their assimilation into American Society appeared as a 
solution for continuation of American progress. Although, the Native Americans 
lived on reserved land and areas, segregated from the whites, the idea of 
reservation or an Indian island surrounded by whites and government sponsored 
assimilation was new. Reservations were designed to introduce civilization to 
the Native Americans. According to the Americans civilized meant 
transformation of the Native Americans from hunting gathering state to a state of 
society depend upon agriculture, learning reading and writing and conversion into 
Christianity.*^  ^ Farming was the essential part of assimilation policy. Through 
farming, the Natives would have permanent settlements that would cease their 
wandering. As, a result their depredations on white settlers would stop. 
Moreover, they would have proper labor and self-sufficient farmers that would 
save public money, which was appropriated annually. When transformation of the 
Native Americans completed, the Indian Islands would vanish from the earth.
First reservations were established for the California Indians in 1853, in 
order to protect the California Indians land rights from the White aggression. For 
this purpose, the Superintendent of California established three reservation farms 
where the Natives Americans were granted land and planted with assist of
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government officials. However, because of unproductive soil and white 
Americans' land claims on the established farms failed the reservations.
When Carlton was appointed Military Commander of New Mexico from. 
California, he hoped to prevent Native American raidings by providing them a 
settled life on the reservation through teaching art of farming. After successful 
campaign of 1864 against the Navajo, he rejected to negotiate any treaty w'ith the 
Indians unlike previous commanders of the region. He ordered removal the 
Navajo to Bosque Redondo. Mining and grazing land dispute were other reasons 
for the Navajo removal. Reports that indicated rich gold mines in Navajo country 
had already attracted miners to Dinetah and Carlton had Fort Whipple built in 
1863 to protect the miners.^  ^ Also, the New Mexicans put pressure on local 
politicians and army officials in order to gain rich grazing areas on the east of the 
Navajo country. Removal of the Navajos would secure mining activities and 
solve the land dispute between the Navajos and New Mexicans as well.
Although economic considerations were important reasons for Navajo 
exile to the Bosque, Carlton's main consideration was civilization of the Navajo 
Indians together with Mescalero Apaches. Bosque Redondo would be an Island 
where all the Navajos would adopt American way of life. If Carlton's plan became 
successful unlike the California experience, his program would become Indian 
policy of the Federal Government.
But, the Bosque never turned a Navajo Island as he expected. It wasedondo 
was a poor choice for a reservation. The soil was unproductive, water was
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undrikable and fuel was scare. In addition, Carlton's feud rather cooperation with 
officials of Bureau of Indian affairs over the jurisdiction of the reservation 
contributed the Bosque's failure. Reservations were designed for Indian 
assimilation. But, for the Navajos, the Bosque became a place where they kept 
their tribal identity against the assimilation and political unification.
1. The Kit Carson Campaign and the Long Walk:
Carlton’s plan to expose the Indians could be assimilated on a 
reservation as an alternative to Washington’s policy of treaty, provide security for 
the future railroads, white settlements, mining puiposes and increased Navajo 
depredations since the massacre at Fort Fountleroy were reasons behind the 
Carson Campaign of 1863-64 and exile of the Navajos to the Bosque Redondo 
Reservation.
First step of Carlton’s plans was the subjugation of the Mescalero Apaches. 
General Carlton authorized Carson to command the campaign and ordered him to 
kill all Mescalero men whenever he could find them. Carlton added that women 
and children were not harmed, they would be kept as prisoners of war; If their 
chiefs begged for peace they had to come to Santa Fe to talk to General Carlton^’. 
Carson subdued the Mescalero Apaches in five months. End of the campaign, the 
Mescaleros were remove to the Bosque Redondo Reservation.
In 1863, before the Carson Campaign, the Navajo were defeated by the 
Americans, demoralized by relentless Ute and New Mexican raids that made them
Edwin L. Sabin, The K it Carson Days. Vol II, New York; The Press of The Pioneers,
1935. p. 711 /
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poor and hungry The Navajo who observed the Mescalero Campaign realized 
that they would be punished like the Apaches. While Carson was on the field 
fighting for subjugation of the Navajo .Indians, a delegation of Navajo Chiefs, 
included Delgadito and Barbancito visited Carlton in Santa Fe in February 1863. 
The chiefs offered to hold a peace council in order to prevent a new campaign 
against the Navajo. Carleton told the delegation that permanent peace would 
achieve when all Navajos accepted to go to Bosque Redondo where they would be 
under the protection of the U.S. government. In April, again a delegation came to 
Fort Wingate when Carlton visited the Fort, but Carlton repeated that the Navajo 
had to go to Bosque Redondo if they wanted peace. Preparations for the Navajo
campaign were completed and on June 15, 1863. Carlton ordered Carson to 
command the campaign. Carson was instructed to “...kill Navajo men without 
parley when they resist to surrender. The women and children would be taken 
prisoners until the people were ready to surrender for deportation to the Bosque 
Redondo.”'°°
Carson based his campaign on two principles. First, he exploited the feud 
between the Navajo and Indian enemies of the Navajo tribe, Pueblos, Hopis and 
especially the Utes. As a former Ute Indian agent, Carson was aware that Utes 
were interested in taking captives and sell them as slaves. Carson needed guidence 
of the Utes warriors who knew the geography of Canyon de Chelly. Carson wrote 
Carlton to allow the Utes to hold Navajo captives and to sell them to the New
Locke, pp. 439-41.
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Mexican families. He emphasized that the captured Navajo women and children 
would be fed and looked after by the Mexicans that would provide better 
condition than they would be on the reservationH ow ever, Carlton rejected 
Carson's request. He ordered that “ all prisoners which are captured by the troops 
or employees of your command (Carson) will be sent to Santa Fe by feet,,,there 
must be no exception to this rule” ''^  ^ Although, Carlton turned down permission 
for slave trade, he encouraged soldiers to fight fiercely by offering price money 
bonus of $20 for every serviceable horse and mule captured from the Navajos and 
delivered to the Quartermasters; and $ 1 for each sheep] The second tactic was 
‘earth-scorched’ policy. He forced the Navajo, to surrender by cutting of their 
economic resources as Canby did in 1860-61, Carson’s soldiers captured Navajo 
herds and horses, Navajo fields were destroyed all the corps of beans, pumpkins, 
corns etc were burnt. He ordered closing of water pits or occupying all water 
supplies with small detachment of troops,'“"*
When the campaign started in June 1863, some of the Navajos moved to 
Deep South and west. But many took refiage in Canyon de Chelly, For centuries. 
Canyon de Chelly, with walls a thousand feet high and thirty miles in length, 
became the stronghold of the Navajos that gave protection from invasions of 
Spaniards, Mexicans and enemy Indian tribes The Navajo Indians endured the 
pressure upon them throughout fall of 1863 and only in small numbers they were
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surrendered. Captured and surrendered Navajos were naked, hungry and 
especially the children suffered from extreme coldl^ *^  Some of the surrendered 
Navajos were released to inform the others to go to the Bosque where they would 
be fed and clothed by the government. Otherwise the campaign would continue 
until they gave up. Carlton considered the winter as the best suitable time to 
subdue the Navajos. He ordered Carson to invade Canyon de Chelly. Carson’s 
winter campaign started on December 6, 1863 and he occupied east and west 
entrance of the canyon and cut off all food supplies of the Navajos. Although 
Carson wanted to delay winter campaign dueto the heavy snow in Navajo country, 
Carlton ordered him to continue his operations until the Navajos begged for 
peace. The Navajo resistance was broken in January. In large numbers, the Navajo 
surrendered voluntarily.
As the number of surrendered and captured Navajos increased at Fort 
Canby and Fort Wingate where they were held as prisoners of war to be sent to 
the Bosque, the army officials burdened feeding them. Therefore, it was 
imperative to remove the Navajos to their new reservation where they could be 
fed cheap.'“’ On February 2, 1864, first contingent of the Navajo, nearly two 
hundred, started their journey from Fort Canby to Fort Sumner at Bosque 
Redondo In, March two thousand Navajos started their journey under the 
guarding of the American soldiers while other were waiting for their term.
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The Navajo call their removal to the Bosque “ The Long Walk” that 
emphazised the length of the route which was approximately three hundred miles. 
The march was torturous for the Navajos. Only a few Navajos, belonged to ricos 
had horses and travelled in comfort. The majority of the Navajo had to journey by 
feet and they were destitute of clothing for the long journey,'®*
The biggest problem that the Navajo faced was food rations. The Navajo 
were reduced to hunger during the Carson's campaign and they were promised to 
be fed at Fort Canby and at Fort Wingate until they started their journey. Flour, 
pork, beans and coffee were commonly issued at the Forts and during the Long 
Walk. However, they were strange to the Navajo and were distributed without 
given any instruction how to prepare them. The Navajos ate flour as raw or dough 
or cooked mush like they used to with corn that killed or made the Navajos sick. 
In addition, the meat was not to fit to eat and every time somebody died from the 
food, the Navajos refused to get anything from the army by thinking that the army 
was trying to poison the Navajos.'®® Many of the Navajos substituted themselves 
with yucca plants, berries and the grain of different plants instead of taking food 
rations. Starvation and dysentery caused deaths on the journey. When the Navajos 
asked to burry their kinsmen, soldiers rejected and the death bodies “were left 
to...be devoured by the coyotes and other animals”."® The mass removal of the 
Navajo continued from winter 1864 to late November 1864 when the Navajo
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population reached 8,570 at the Bosque."’The journey to the Bosque was the 
beginning of the difficulties that they would have experienced at the Bosque."^
Carson campaign subdued five thousand Navajo Indians at Canyon de 
Chelly, but influential Navajo chiefs Manuelito, Barbontico, Armijo and Ganado 
Mucho were still free"^ and kept on giving trouble to the New Mexicans as
Superintendent of New Mexico, Micheál Steck did complain in his letter, “ a vast
majority of the warriors are still in their own country and those at Bosque 
Redondo are principally the poor who have willingly given Themselves up under 
the promises that should be fed. .. complaints of stock having been reported 
during last two weeks...it is claimed that the tribe is subdued.”'"
But, surrender of Manuelito in February 1865, and other chiefs ended the 
Navajo threat. Carson's campaign compelled the Navajo to “abondon an area of 
country larger than the State of Ohio to the pastoral and mining purposes of 
(American) citizens and left entirely free the transmit from this territory (Navajo 
country) to Arizona and California”.
2. Navajo Cultural Resistance at Bosque Redondo:
The Bosque Redondo Reservation never make the Navajos self sufficient 
farmers as General Carlton hoped. Unproductive soil, natural disasters and
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immense cost of feeding the Navajos failed the Bosque. As well as economic 
difficulties, Navajos’ cultural resistance against Carlton’s assimilation plan was 
another important factor for their return to Dinetah. Settled life through farming , 
Anglo-American education of the Navajo childen and conversion into Christianity 
were objectives of assimilation program. Carlton’s assimilation plan seemed to be 
successful. Many Navajo family units that Carlton considered as core to the 
Navajo culture had been destroyed during Carson’s Campaign. First time in their 
history eight thousand Navajos gathered together on a different environment and 
they were strange to each others. On the Bosque, the Navajo Indians were no 
longer master of their fate but a subject people of directed cultural change 
Unlike Carlton’s expectations, Navajos resisted against assimilation program 
although they had no free choice to reject what was directed to them. As they did 
during Spanish period, Navajos refused or adopted Anglo-American traits that 
could be fit to the Navajo culture and help them to survive on the Bosque. For 
example, the Navajos accepted farming not as part of Carlton’s assimilation plan, 
but to get enough rations. As difficulties or pressure of the authorities increased 
over the Navajos, they more attached to their culture that forced Carlton’s plan to 
make it suitable to the Navajosl^^ Resistance to keep what they accustomed or 
believe created cooperation among the Navajos that resulted in return their 
homeland.
First step to Carlton’s assimilation program was political and cultural 
reorganization of the Navajo tribe.In, April 1865, Board of Officers made
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lifetime, his ghost can give trouble to living ones. Navajos think that the best way 
avoid from the ghost is to abondon the dead in a hogan and left his belongings 
The custom was difficult to be understood by Carlton and other American 
authorities. Navajos resisted to enter the adobe again when death occurred that 
forced Carlton to give up Navajo pueblo. Navajos were allowed to settle in family 
groups around the confines of the post, close to planting grounds.'^'
For the same reason, Navajos rejected to have medical treatment from 
army doctors at the post hospital.When Navajos learned their relatives died at the 
hospital they avoid entering hospital. Because of this belief, army surgeon Doctor 
Gwenter removed nearly dying patients from the hostpital or he treated the 
patients outside. Apart from fear of ghost, Navajos were suspicious about having 
modern medical treatment. Doctor Gwenter accused medicine men of preveting 
Navajos to come to hospital. Although sickness was widespread among the 
Navajos, they applied medicine men to cure and Doctor Gwenter stated Navajo 
attitude as an ignorant act that steadily declined the usefulness of the hospital 
But, from the Navajo point of view sickness or accidental injury may be 
disturbance of The Holy People or supematurals that keep the world in order. 
Medicine man is responsible to appease the supematurals by performing curing 
ceromony .Navajo ceromonies require large gathering of people for being 
effectivei '^* During ceromony the patient is surrendered by his kinsmen, neighbors
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and friends that the patience fells himself succored and l o v e d . E n d  of the 
ceromony family and kinsmen of the patient do payment to the medicine man and 
feed the guests.Expenses of the guest are shared both by the family and his 
kinsmen.Thus, each curing ceromony is spiritual and material cooperation 
between family, kinsmen and neighbors.At Bosque Redondo, Navajo ceromonies 
functioned as a cultural unity and spiritual power to endure diseases, 
homesickness, and hunger.Ceromonies became meeting of kinsmen, neighbors 
and friends \vho did not only pray to cure the patient but to be released from 
captivity and return to Dinetah.Navajo Indians challenged to send their children 
to Anglo school at the Fort Summer. Carlton considered that education was 
essential for the success assimilation. The Navajo children would be taught truths 
of Christianity and art of peace through education. They would acquire new 
habits, new ideas and new modes of life and became happy content people who 
would rememember the Navajo Wars only as something in the past,'^^ Carlton 
had a chaplain built near the Fort Sumner and in May 1865, Bishop Lamy with 
two assistances was appointed to educate Indian Children*'^^ Navajos sent their 
children to school to get additional rations. When army rations remained same or 
cut off, Navajos ceased attending to school and the chaplain was deserted·'^* 
Carlton was not the only person who attempted to convert the Navajos into 
Christianity. Spaniards established missions at Cebolleta and Encinal around 
1750s to convert the Navajos. Navajos attended missions as long as they were
Klucholm and Leighton, p.96.
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given food, clothing or livestock. As Father Miguel Menchero of Cebolleta 
mission stated, the Navajos “had no desire to live like Pueblos or wish to be 
Christians!’ Navajo reaction was the same toward the Protestant missionaries 
which became intense after the region was added to the United States. A 
Methodist missionary described the Navajo country as the most heathenish one 
in the Southwest and he remarked “their rites, ceremonies, and all their worship 
showed them to be entirely ignorant of God, and the light that comes from
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Christianity 130 Navajos viewed Christianity complex set of beliefs and
unadoptable to their beliefs.For example, Bible speaks of a male God and of a 
society where authority and responsibility centers chiefly in men whereas in the 
Navajo society both sexes cooperated in many activities such as housebuilding, 
farming.^ '^
Bosque Redondo was economic failure because of unproductivity of soil, 
alkali water and scarity of wood. Also, Bosque was disaster for assimilation of the 
Native Americans. Carlton planned to weaken kinship, clan and band relationship 
and alienated Navajos by destroying family units during Carson’s Campaign. 
Thus, Carlton thought that Anglo-American culture would replace the Navajo. But 
Carlton did not predict any resistance from the Navajo Indians. As a reaction to 
Carlton’s assimilation policy, Navajo Indians rejected Anglo education, modern 
medical treatment and Christianity that either clashed to their beliefs or
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considered not to get any benefit from it. Instead, Navajos more attached to their 
ceremonies to bring cure to their desperate situation at the Bosque that created 
psychological and spiritual, unity unlike Carlton’s expectation.
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3. Economics at the Bosque:
Although Steck warned Carlton productivity of the Bosque, Carlton 
considered the Bosque’s location best for farming. According to Carlton, location 
of the Reservation was the richest in the territory. Lands of the Bosque were flat 
and with opening of acquitas (irrigation ditch), Pecos River would provide 
irrigation.Carlton believed that Navajos would become self-sufficient farmers 
in one or two years and he hoped Steck could provide financial aid until the 
transformation completed. However, Steck who opposed Navajo settlement on the 
Bosque rejected any kind of financial aid to furnish Navajos that put the General 
in a difficult position.
Farming project started soon when the first group of the Navajo arrived the 
Bosque in February. The Navajo worked very hard to plant crops under the 
Superintendency of Captain Colloway. They ditched acquitas, cleaned the farming 
land from mesquito roots and planted three thousand acres of corn, pumpkins etc. 
Harvest in summer could solve the problem of subsidizing the Navajos for next 
winter. However, expectation of good harvest failed when army worm damaged 
planted com before it came to maturity. In October, wheat, planted to augment 
of the com was beaten by series of cloudburst. The Navajo would spend the
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winter by depending on army rations. Winter was harsh for theNavajo. Although e 
Congress appropriated $100,000 for the Navajos in June 1864, the aid did not 
reach the reservation. In September the Navajo were counted as eight thousand 
that needed rations immediately.
Crop failure and the Navajo struggle to survive with little army rations did 
not affect Carlton’s wish to make the Bosque Indian plantation. Under the 
direction of military authorities, the Navajo enlarged and expended acquitas and 
plantation ground increased from three thousand to nine thousand acres. 
According to estimates cultivated crops would not only furnish full supplies of the 
Navajo, but would furnish Fort Sumner as well. In addition large quantity of 
wheat was planted in addition to the usual amount of corn, so that in the event of a 
failure of the latter crop, a sufficient quantity of grain might be raised for their 
s uppor t . L i ke  previous year, hopeful expectations were shattered in mid­
summer when larva of armyworms were realised. Also, heavy frosts and rains 
and hails destroyed all crops at the Bosque like anywhere else in New Mexico. 
Harvest was very much beloved the expectations; corn totalled 423,582, wheat 
34,113 pounds that could feed the Navajo for one or two months,'^*’
After two years of crop failure, the New Mexicans began to critisize 
enormous cost of subsidizing the Navajo and named the Bosque ‘Sweet 
Carltonia’. They were already upset to share best grazing grounds with the Navajo 
and they feared increase of Navajo depradetions again. Although Joint 
Committee’s investigation and Graves' reports emphasized the insufficiency of the
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Bosque, the Navajo were still held as prisoners of war. Result of these reports was 
the appointment of a permanent Navajo agent, Theodore Dodd. When he came to 
the reservation, like ex-superintendent Steck, he critisized Carlton to choose the 
Bosque as a reservation. According to Dodd, the Navajo were good weavers and 
hearders. They should have encouraged raising livestock that was the best thing 
the Navajo could do and the Navajo women's excellency in weawing should have 
turned into profitable business. If Navajos furnished with wool they could weave 
their blankets that would save thousands of dollars spending for the blankets and 
they could trade them with Mexicans. Although he was not in favour of making 
the Navajo farmers, he worked for development of Navajo farming. He purchased 
modern agricultural implement with appropriated money and recommended hiring 
of “ a practical farmer at a good salary three or four assistants and about good 
workers to direct Indian labour, take care of tools, seeds grain and public 
property”.'^’ But, Dodd’s struggle to improve farming at the Bosque failed. The 
corn had poorest quality and like previous year totalled corps could be sufficient 
just for a few months. Disappointed Navajos deserted the reservation in large 
numbers Eight thousand decreased to five thousand and they refused to plant 
anything for 1867.
The crop failure of 1866 prepared end of Carlton. Criticism against 
‘Sweet Carltonia’ became harsh and the citizens of New Mexico addressed to 
memorial to President Andrew Johnson asking for Carlton’s removal. Carlton was
Dodd, to Special Agent, Feb 6* 1866, Correll, Vol 5, p.303.
appointed to Florida in September 1867 and the Navajo were transformed from 
the War Department to interior,’
4. Politics at Bosque Redondo Reservation:
Mining and animal husbandry for the benefit of the Americans were 
important reasons of Navajo exile to the Bosque. But, the main reason was 
Carlton’s plan transformation of raider tribe into civilised ones through 
assimilation. But, Steck objected Carlton's plan, opposition to prevent removal of 
the Navajos to the Bosque strained the relationship between the army and Indian 
officials. Lack of cooperation between the two offices increased the Navajo 
struggle on the reservation. Disagreement between the General and 
Superintendent locked on two points; whether the Bosque was a suitable 
reservation for the Navajo Indians or not and which office was in charge of the 
Navajo Indians.
Steck, like General Carlton was in favour of the reservation system in 
order to protect them from white aggression and to facilitate their assimilation 
through introducing private property, making them self sufficient farmers and 
educating the Indian children at Anglo schools. But, the Superintendent disagreed 
as to the Navajo removal to the Bosque Redondo. It was designed for small 
number of Indians. It could feed mostly 2,500 people. On the other hand, the 
Navajo population was estimated at 16,000.They had thousands of horses and not 
less than 500,000 sheep. The size made it impracticable to locate them upon a
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reservation of forty square miles with six thousand acres of arable land.'^^ Steck 
supported his argument with a letter of John A. Clark, the general surveyor of the 
territory. Clark shared Steck’s concern. If, the Navajos were removed to the 
Bosque, forty miles square land, scare timber and drinking water could not supply 
their needs.
Steck’s second objection was the establishment of Navajos and the 
Mescalero Apache who were hostile to each other for centuries, upon the same 
reservation. Carlton belived that the Navajo and the Mescalero Apache were 
same group of Indians. He had realized similarities between two tribes. Both were 
raiders and distant cousins, and their languages were similar. But, Carlton 
neglected profound differences of the Native American tribes in beliefs, 
sentiments, habits and customs When the Navajo arrived the Bosque, the 
Mescalero Apache were working in the farms under army guard. Although, the 
Apaches had no experience of farming like Navajos, they showed good signs for 
Carlton’s assimilation plan. But, the Navajo pressure caused Mescalere 
desertation of the reservation. The Navajo settlement outnumbered the Mescaleros 
and their gardens and livestock became main target for raids of the hungry 
Navajos. In spring 1865, 355 Apache left the Bosque and in November, the 
number of the Mescaleros on the reservation was twelve. In his annual report. 
Commissioner of the Indian affairs accepted that the Bosque was failure for the 
Mescalero Apache, “Mescalero Apaches faithfully tilled the soil with ample
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success, when the Navajos removed to that place. Being feud with the Navajos 
and outnumbered by them, Mescalero Apaches gradually left the reservation...thus 
ihiits of two or three years in labor in reclaiming them from their savage life has 
been lost.”’"
Like the Apache and Navajo feud, Carlton dismissed the Commanche and 
Navajo hostility by making them neighbours. The Commanche considered Bosque 
as their ancestral land and hated Navajo establishment upon there. They raided 
Navajo livestock and took Navajo captives. The Commanche raids were 
encouraged by Mexican traders who constantly visited the region with donkeys 
loaded with merchandise and in many cases with whisky and ammunition. These 
traders exchanged goods for cattle and horses, and supplied the Commanche with 
whisky and ammunition . Strict army control in the region could spoil profitable 
illegal trade. The Commanche raids upon the herds of the Navajos were not only 
to get their livestock to sell and use, but also to make Navajos dissatisfied with 
their situation and to compel them to desert the Bosque Redondo,'"'^.
The second controversy between Carlton and Steck was whether the 
army or the Indian office was in charge of the Navajos. The reservation was 
managed according to double jurisdiction; while the military was feeding the 
Navajo captives, stood guard and superintending the farming operations, the 
Indian Bureau provided clothing and equipment.*' '^* The Biggest problem of the 
controversy was money appropriation to subsidize the Navajo Indian. Steck was
Norton, Report to tlie Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington: GPO, 1866; p. 32. 
Norton to Cooley, July 1866, GPO, 1866: p. 146.
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responsible to prepare budget for the tribes under his charge according to reports 
of Indian agents. Steck rejected any financial help to the Navajos from the budget 
of Bureau of Indian Affairs. He stated that the Navajos were prisoners of war that 
meant they were under the charge of the War Department.
Carson’s military success at the Canon de Chelly in January 1864, yielded 
surrender of thousands of Navajos, most of whom volunteered to go to the Bosque 
where they were promised food . General Carlton estimated that the Navajo could 
start subsidizing themselves in a year. Until they start farming and harvesting 
crops, army could feed the Navajo Indians. However, increased number of the 
Navajo who urgently needed clothing, food and shelter run the military provisions 
in a short time. By the end of 1864, the number of Navajos on the reservation 
reached over eight thousand. Carlton had no preparation for the great amount of 
the Navajo. He believed that New Mexican Superintendency was responsible 
taking care of the Navajo. The military had the job of settling the Navajo on the 
reservation. On the other hand, Steck refused to take charge of the Navajo. Steck 
considered them as prisoners of war that made the Navajo belong to the war 
department and should be held by the War Department until hostilities ease with 
the tribe. Steck emphasized that the Superintendency had no funds for 
incidental expenses or provisions and hence, could not take charge of them and 
provide for their wants. But, Steck could be authorized to purchase blankets and
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clothing “as an act of charity, relieve the suffering Navajos that kind intentions of 
the government towards them”.
Steck’s main concern was the expense of the Navajo on the Bosque .In 
March 1864, Carlton sent former superintendent of New Mexico, Collins, who 
supported Carlton’s Bosque policy, to Washington D.C. in order to find fund for 
the Navajos. As a result of their effort. Congress appropriated $ 100,000 to 
“settling subsisting and supporting the captive Navajos in Bosque Redondo” in 
July.*^ *^  Steck pointed out that Navajos costed $700,000 to the War Department 
from March 1 to June 25 and the appropriated money could feed the Navajos just 
for two weeks. Steck warned the Department of Interior not to take charge of the 
Navajo whose needs could not be supplied by the Office of the Indian Affairs.'"*  ^
Steck’s fear about the cost of feeding Navajos came true in fall of 1864 with the 
failure of crops second time in a year. Carlton’s plan to make the Navajos self- 
sufficient in a year failed. Eight thousand Navajo would need army provisions to 
spend the winter. Steck critized Carlton again. According Steck, Bosque Redondo 
was not suitable for farming. Water of the Pecos River was very salty and few 
years irrigation would make the soil unproductive if the water was not sterilized
78
146 Ibid.
' Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy In New Mexico: 1858- 1880 New Mexican  
H i s t o r i c a l ( 1 9 3 8 ) : p .  23.
148
149
W.P. Dole to Secretary of Interior, July 16^ ‘" 1864, Washington: GPO 1864: p. 356-57. 
Steck to W.P. Dole, June 25’^  1864, Washington: GPO 1864: p. 359.
totally. According to Stock , best solution for the Navajos to send them back to 
their country and to be given a proper reservation.
Although Superintendent Steck was right that Bosque could not be a 
permanent settlement for the Navajo Indians, scandals in the B.I.A weakened his 
position and he resigned from the office in April 1865. The first charge against the 
B.I.A purchased items that arrived the Bosque end of December. As a part of his 
duty, Steck delivered blankets, shoes, tools and beads to the Navajo A board of 
army officers that were army personnel was authorized to be present at the 
distribution.’ '^ A short time later. Board of Inquiry found that many purchased 
items had no immediate needs such as nails, iron, blacksmith’s tools and leather. 
Moreover, many items were purchased at prices higher than market value. 
Blankets for example, were purchased at an average of $ 15.80 per pair in other 
departments of the government (Quartermasters and Ordinance). They were 
furnished at an average of $5.85 per pair.'^^ The Board concluded that all the 
goods could be purchased between $30,000 or $ 40.000 According to Steck's 
total cost of items was approximately $ 100.000. The Board of Inquiry submitted 
their report to Carlton. He sent reports to Washington. Steck countered the 
charges and in a letter to the Commissioner of the Indian Affairs. He commented 
that blankets were purchased in the east where prices were considerably higher, 
and that “the inspection estimates were based on examination of little more than
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half of the articles actually purchased”. There was no inquiry for Steck . But 
accusations worsened the relationship between two offices.
Second charge was made against Mescalero Apache agent Lorenzo 
Labadie. Labadie shared the same opinion with Steck. Labadi tried to keep the 
Navajo herds and the Navajos out of the grazing land that he claimed belonged to 
the Mescaleros. After army’s investigation, it was revealed that Labadie’s large 
flock of sheep was grazing in reservation limits and that was purchasing animals 
from the Indians. Carlton ordered him not to drive off his flock out of reservation 
limits and forbid him from trading with the Indians under his charge.Later ,  
when Labadi, interfered with two army officers, he was forced to resign from the 
Indian office.
In March 1865, Second Lieutenant Edwin J. Edgar, commanding the 
picket guard at the post, inspected several vagons that belonged to the agent and 
he found two sacks of corn and a number of agricultural implements, which were 
property of the government. When Labadi was questioned about his cargo, he 
confessed that he took articles from Captain Calloway, Superintendent of Navajo 
farms. In addition, he revealed that he had negotiated with Quartermaster officer. 
Captain Prince G. Morton and he had seventy-five sheep that belonged to the U.S. 
Army Both military officers were dismissed from the service and Labadi was 
ordered. In April Superintendent Steck resigned from the office.
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Doolittle Committee:
When the Civil War ended, the United States turned its attention to the 
Indian problem. In Washington, there was growing suspicion that many Indian 
wars were provoked by aggressions of lawless white men  ^ On March 3, 1865, 
a joint committee composed of members of both houses of the Congress was 
appointed to direct inquiry into the condition of the Indian tribes and their 
treatment by the civil and military authorities.'^*  ^ Senator James R. Doolittle of 
Wisconsin became the head of the committee. Doolittle Committee arrived New 
Mexico in summer and collecting data by testifying officials from the army and 
Indian department, clergy, business, social and political leaders. The 
investigation of the Committee revealed deep Indian problems of New Mexico.
The Committee was convinced that slavery was the main cause of the 
conflict between New Mexicans and the Indians. As a result of the investigation. 
President Andrew Johnson's order on June 9 1866 banned the enslavement of 
Indians by the New Mexicans and any Indian or Mexican slave raids. But in New 
Mexico, the practice still continued among the New Mexicans. Slavery was a 
custom that has been long existed in New Mexico and the tribes in the territory 
had carried on this kind of traffic. Large amount of slaves were the Navajo. As 
a resident pointed out during his testimony, the Navajo had sheep, horses and 
many children. The committee was convinced that the Navajos were victims of 
the slave raids of New Mexicans provoked Navajos for reprisal.
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On the other hand, the committee did not reach any conclusion over the 
Bosque issue. BIA , army officials and civilians had different opinions about the 
reservation. Carlton told the committee that the reservation system was the only 
solution for assimilation of the Navajo and other Native American tribes. 
According to Carlton, the problem of the Bosque was double jurisdiction and he 
suggested the sole control of the Native Americans to be vasted with the War 
Department. Like Carlton, Carson agreed to transfer of the Indian Bureau to the 
military in order to prevent jealousies among the employment of the different 
departments. Former Indian Agent John Greiner considered the Bosque’s main 
problem was frequently changed agents who were usually appointed for political 
services. Governor Connelly was in favour of the Navajo settlement on the 
Bosque. But, Herrero, as spokesmen of his people told the committee of the 
sufferings of the Navajo on the Bosque. Before coming to the Bosque, the 
Navajos had many sheep and horses but lost them during round -up, when they 
were taken by the Utes and the Mexicans. On the reservation they did not have 
enough food to eat, they could not drink the water because it had alkali and killed 
or made many Navajos sick. Soldiers did not treat them well. When, they were at 
work; if they stopped soldiers kicked them or whipped them. Herrero added that 
all the Navajos wanted to go to their country and he promised not to commit act of 
hostility. Another witness, Percy Ayers agreed with Herrero that water was very 
bad, could not be drunk. Moreover, wood was rare. The Bosque could not feed the 
Navajo'*^  ^ The committee members also learned horrors of the Navajo round up 
and the long walk.
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When the Doolittle Committee returned to Washington, the Committee 
requested the Interior Department to investigate the Bosque to have more clear 
information about the reservation, and the Navajo problem. For a new 
investigation, the secretary of Interior appointed Julius K. Graves as a special 
agent to report . .the facts necessary to a conclusion as to retain the Navajos at 
the Bosque permanently and as to the cost of providing for them there, with 
allotments of land and to make examination and report as to the condition of 
affairs at each other agencies in regard to which this office is launmentably 
deficient in information knowing neither has been done or what ought to be done 
behalf of the Indian
Graves made a through and detailed series of reports in the spring of 
1866. Graves was convinced that policy of general Carlton did have an excellent 
effect that the Navajoes were doing well upon the reservation. This was the best 
that government could do to put an end to the quarrels between the New Mexicans 
and the Navajos. The reservation was suitable for the Navajos but not together 
with the Mescaleros. The water was all right, although complaints and dysentery 
among the Navajos, and Pecos Valley was suitable for grazing!' '^* The handicap of 
the Bosque was divided jurisdiction. The Navajo were prisoners of war and 
sustained as to all supplies beyond what they raised themselves. They should be 
either under the control of the War Department or the Department of Interior. 
Slavery carried on practicing even the order of the President. Graves wanted
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Congress to handle the issue and take proper measures in order to reduce the
slavery in New Mexico. After the reports of Graves, secretary of Interior,
Harlan demanded from the War Departmant the transfer of the Navajo prisoners
to the Department of Interior. Also, he wanted to learn exact cost of
subsidizing the Indians at Bosque Redondo. Harlan founded that from March 1,
1864 to October 1 1865, the Navajo had costed $ 1,114,981.70 to the War
Department just for feeding. On September 19, 1866, the Secretary of War
directed the Commander of the Missouri to relieve Carlton from the duty in New
Mexico and order him to report to duty with his regiment in the Department of the
Gulf Carlton was ordered to turn over the control of the Navajo Indians to Agent
Dodd. N e w  M e x ic a n  newspaper announced removal of General Carlton with joy:
It thus appears that our territor)' will be relieved from the 
Presenee of this man Carlton who has so long lorded among us 
For five years or more he lias been in supreme command in New 
Mexico....Tlie community at large will rejoice at liis removal”
Carlton's assimilation policy of the Navajo through introducing farming, 
education and Christianity failed. The Bosque’s unproductive land, crop failures, 
troubles between the Office of Indian Affairs and ignoring hostilities among the 
Indian tribes and cultural resistance by the Navajo made the Bosque disaster for 
the Navajos.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The four-year confinement at the Bosque Redondo Reservation was both a 
tragedy and a triumph for the Navajo. On one hand, the Navajo suffered 
unprecedented material and cultural hardships after they gave up military 
resistance to the United States. Economic scarcity, a harsh climate, and 
unsympathetic federal overseers caused death, disease, and demoralization among 
the Navajo. On the other hand, unlike in earlier conflicts, all of the Navajo 
experienced the same difficulties at the same time at the Bosque. This shared 
suffering forced them to act as one people politically and culturally, and their 
collective resistance to assimilation helped convince Carlton’s enemies at the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs to end the experiment at the Bosque. The Navajo never 
regained full political autonomy nor did they recapture thousands of acres of lost 
land, but they helped stop a policy that had as its end goal the eradication of the 
Navajo as a distinct cultural group.
The report of the Doolittle Committee was submitted to the U.S. Congress 
in 1868. As a result of the Report, Congress formed the U.S. Indian Peace 
Commission, a delegation composed of military men and civilians. The 
Commission went to the West to negotiate treaties with Native American tribes, 
including the Navajo, in order to settle them on reservations with well-defined 
b o r d e r s . T h e  Peace Commission came to the Bosque at the end of May and the 
Navajo were allowed to return Dinetah under the terms of the Treaty of June 
1,1868. The treaty ended the suffering of the Navajo at the Bosque.
169 Iverson, p. 41.
The United States wanted to corral the Navajo at the Bosque in order to 
open northern New Mexico and Arizona to economic exploitation by white 
farmer, miners, and railroad promoters. In addition to these familiar motives for 
Indian removal, Carlton wanted to test out an alternative to the government’s 
policy of “treaty and segregation.” Carlton’s wanted to assimilate the Navajo 
into the American mainstream by supplanting herding with farming, family 
education with government schooling, and tribal religion with Christianity. If he 
succeeded, his plan could be applied to other tribes.
The Bosque Redondo experiment failed for three reasons. The land was 
not suited to farming. Second, Carlton’s disagreements with Superintendents 
Steck, later Norton and Navajo agent Dodd, tied up funding for the reservation. 
Finally, the Navajo fought against the assimilation program and made it 
unworkable even had the other conditions been better. Carlton did not assimilate 
the Navajo Indians by teaching them American ways. Since their migration to the 
Southwest, the Navajo consistently adapted traits of other cultures to fit their own 
needs, and rejected traits that did not benefit them. For instance, the Navajo 
domesticated sheep and horses in imitation of the Spaniards and made these 
innovations central features of their economy, but they rejected Christianity 
because its cosmology offered no compelling arguments for the abandonment of 
Navajo myths and beliefs related to Dinetah and the world around it. Traditional 
cultural practices that distinguished the Navajo from outsiders helped them resist 
Carlton’s assimilation program at the Bosque Redondo. For example, their 
religion gave them a rationale for rejecting adobe homes and modem medical 
treatment. Religious ceremonies that focused on prayers for return to Dinetah
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gave the Navajo a sense of common spirit that helped them to return there. The 
way that culture informed Navajo resistance is exemplified in Barboncito’s reply
i
to General Sherman’s proposal that they move to Oklahoma. Barboncito said 
that.
Our grandfathers had no idea of living any other country except our and I 
do not think that it is right for us to do so, as we were never taught to. 
When the Navajos were first created four mountains and four rivers were 
pointed out to us, inside of which we should live that was our country and 
was given to us by the first woman of the Navajo tribe. It was told to us by 
our forefathers that we were never to the east of Rio Grande or west of San 
Juan Rivers and I think coming here has been the cause of much death 
among us and our animals . . .  we plant but it does not yield because we
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were brought here. 170
Sherman understood the impossibility of removing the Navajo to the east because 
of their “strong prejudices” about their land.'^' General Carlton subdued the 
Navajo Indians militarily but he did not break the firmly established Navajo 
culture.
Despite their success in preserving their culture and holding onto some 
part of the Dinetah, the Navajo were changed by the Bosque years. The defeat 
inflicted by Carson and the four years of close supervision by the U.S. army ended 
Navajo military raids on rival settlements. In addition, the seeds of Navajo 
political unity were sewn at the Bosque. The Treaty of June 1, 1868 gave the 
Navajo back one-fourth of their traditional territory. To regain the land covered 
by the Four Sacred Mountains became ultimate goal of all Navajos. Over the 
years, peaceful negotiations with the federal government enabled the Navajo to 
enlarge thpir reservation from 3,500,000 acres to 16,000,000. Today the Navajo
Baitwncito To Sherman, May 28''’ 1868, CqireU, Vol 6, pp..31-32. 
Sherman to Grant, June 1868, M666 Rqll 639, 1868.
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occupy the largest reservation in the United States, and have the largest 
reservation population (150,000).
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